THE MARGINAL RELEVANCE OF CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
STEWART E. STERKIn recent years, the legal academy has seen a renaissance in
choice of law theory. After a period of great intellectual ferment
during the 1950s and 1960s-when academics substantially reshaped
thinking about conflicts-choice of law scholars in the 1970s and
early 1980s were largely content to refight old battles, sharpening
or fine-tuning arguments here and there. Over the last several
years, however, a number of scholars have attempted to reconceptualize choice of law, incorporating currents in legal thinking-law and
economics, the jurisprudence of rights, and game theory-that have
previously been applied to more substantive areas of law.'
This new wave of choice of law scholarship, however, has left
choice of law theory and practice in its usual state of disarray.
Contemporary theorists are no more in agreement regarding choice
of law methodology than were their predecessors. Some scholars
remain unreconstructed interest analysts, 2 while others advocate
more territorial approaches.' Some believe rules are essential to
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I See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:

FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE

DIREcTIONS 145-230 (1991) (borrowing from economic analysis of law, game theory,

and rights theory in developing a workable system of choice of law that furthers the
goals that states actually have); Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1242-45 (1987) (developing an offspring of traditional vested
rights theory called "vestedness" from basic ideas about the nature of law to serve as
a foundation for choice of law); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLrM.
L. REV. 277, 340 (1990) (arguing that his "canons of construction" for choice of law
questions result in a positive-sum game for states); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity,
80 CEO. L.J. 52, 55-58, 80-89 (1991) (discussing Kramer's canons and applying game
theory to conflicts).
2 See Robert A. Sedler, Continuity, Preceden4 and Choice of Law: A Reflective
Response to ProfessorHill, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1419, 1426 (1992) (asserting that interest
analysis is "the preferred approach to choice of law because it provides functionally
sound and fair solutions to the choice of law issues arising in actual cases");
Weinberg,supra note 1, at 73-75 (performingan interest analysis on EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), and concluding that the "classic interest-analytic
prescription is for the interested forum to apply its own law").
3 See BRiLMAYER, supra note 1, at 216-21 (proposing a rights-based approach to
choice of law problems which incorporates territoriality to protect the parties' rights);
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 318 (1992) (arguing that in
(949)

950

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:949

choice of law4 while others believe that choice of law rules are
undesirable. 5
Choice of law theorists differ not only about method but also
about the very foundations of choice of law theory. Conventional
interest analysts and most contemporary scholars evaluate choice of
law rules or methods by reference to the consequences those rules
or methods produce.6 Indeed, some have explicitly labelled their
methods "functional" approaches to choice of law. 7 By contrast,
some scholars, most notably Lea Brilmayer, question consequentialist thinking and argue that choice of law doctrine should rest on
8
deontological, rights-based premises.
Moreover, as choice of law theorists debate the fundamental
premises of choice of law theory, other conflicts scholars complain
that choice of law theory has focused on problems far removed from
those faced by contemporary courts.9
Friedrich Juenger, in
particular, has lamented that theorists continue to debate the
proper approach to guest statutes and wrongful death limitations

choice of law problems, "the territorial allocation of state authority is a fundamental
constitutional principle... [and] too deeply embedded in our law to requirejustification").
" See Kramer, supra note 1, at 319-38 (proposing five "canons of construction" that
reflect compromises states would make in choice of law problems).
' See Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law-Rules vs. Analysis: A More Workable Marriage
Than the (Second) Restatement; A Very Well-Curried Leflar Over Reese Approach, 40
MERCER L. REV. 869, 874-76 (1989) (advocating use of rules as rebuttable presumptions with Leflar's choice-influencing factors filling the gaps (citing Robert A. Leflar,
ConflictsLaw: More on Choice-InfluencingConsiderations,54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1585-88
(1966))).
6 SeeJoseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1989) (arguing that
in order to choose among territorial rules, policy considerations must be taken into
account); Weinberg, supra note 1, at 94 ("Rather than abstractions like comity and
reciprocity, what the world needs is effective control of spoliation and predation, and
administration of law free of local dysfunction and systemic risk."); cf BRILMAYER,
supra note 1, at 145-89 (discussing maximization policies and how a choice of law
system can enable states to achieve their goals).
7 See Russell J. Weintraub, Methodsfor Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass
Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 129, 131-34 (1989).
' See BRLMAYER, supra note 1, at 191-230; see also Dane, supra note 1, at 1245
(arguing that a "Norm-Based" view of law requires an analysis of substantive legal
rights rather than determinations made because of concerns about enforcement or
decisions based on the forum in which the action was brought).
9
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disastersand the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 105, 106 (1989) (stating that conflict of law scholars are preoccupied with "dead
and moribund issues" and are "prone to disregard an abundance of real-life cases,
relying instead on contrived hypotheticals" in developing their theories); Linda S.
Mullenix, FederalizingChoice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1623,
1624-25 (1992) (supportingJuenger's assertion).
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while ignoring products liability and 10other mass torts, the most
pressing of today's conflicts problems.
Judicial opinions suggest thatJuenger is right: modern choice
of law scholarship has been singularly unhelpful in a host of
important choice of law cases. In the celebrated Agent Orange
litigation, the distinguished Judge Jack Weinstein announced that
"national consensus law"-an entity foreign to choice of law
scholars-would be applied to resolve the knotty choice of law
problems involved in assessing liability for injuries to American
soldiers and civilians resulting from the use of toxic chemicals in
Vietnam." In other cases, where courts do purport to apply one or
another conventional choice of law approach, the result in the case
often appears to have dictated the judge's choice of law approach
at least as much as the approach itself generated the result. The
widespread popularity of the Second Restatement of Conflict of
3
Laws, 12 perhaps the most malleable of choice of law approaches,
tends to confirm the judgment that choice of law theory exerts at
best a marginal influence on choice of law decisions.
Nevertheless, the choice of law picture is not entirely dismal.
Widespread approval by courts of party autonomy rules has made
it more possible for commercial parties to avoid choice of law
confusion. 4 Thus, as a practical matter, the failure of choice of
law theory has been most pronounced in tort cases and in contract
cases in which the contract does not reveal the parties' expectations
about choice of law.' 5
My thesis is simple. Choice of law is in disarray because
conflicts scholars have not made the case that choice of law theory
supra note 9, at 107-08.
nIn re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690,696 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
10 SeeJuenger,

12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1971); see also infra note 121.

"sFor instance, the Second Restatement provides that "[t]he rights and liabilities
of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles state in § 6." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971). The Second Restatement then lists four
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6, and instructs that
"[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue." Id. § 145(2). Section six, in turn, lists seven factors
"relevant to the choice of the applicable rule." Id. § 6.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 67-72.
's See infra text accompanying notes 80-213.
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should matter in deciding a wide variety of cases. They have not
persuaded judges that judges should take care to make "correct"
choice of law decisions. As a result, courts often worry less about
choice of law than about the other substantive implications of the
decisions they reach."
This is not a correctable problem. Conflict scholars have failed
to persuade courts about the importance of choice of law not
because scholars are insufficiently persuasive or judges are insufficiently receptive, but because in many cases reaching the "correct"
choice of law result is and should be less important to judges than
other substantive law considerations. In these cases, subordinating
choice of law concerns generates only one identifiable social costthe cost of uncertainty in litigation. That loss, however, would be
avoidable only if virtually all courts consistently and uniformly
embraced the same choice of law approach-a possibility so unlikely
that in resolving these cases courts understandably and justifiably
pay little more than lip service to choice of law theory.
After Section I's brief survey of the development of choice of
law theory, Section II examines the limited impact choice of law
theory has had on decided cases. Section III explores the reasons
for the failure of choice of law theory, and explains why no
comprehensive choice of law theory, whether consequentialist or
rights-based, will or should supersede the judicial inclination to
focus on substantive results in the cases before them.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHOICE OF LAW THEORY

A. From Beale to Currie
Joseph Beale, the reporter for the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 17 shaped choice of law theory for much of the first
half of the twentieth century. His influence was due not so much
to widespread acceptance of his ideas but rather to the use of his
work as a focal point for the realist critique of choice of law
orthodoxy.
In Beale's view, the common law "consisted of a system of
thought based upon principles which covered every possible

176

See infra text accompanying notes 170-95.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1934).
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occurrence. Every human act was either permitted or forbidden;
every act either changed or left unchanged existing rights." 8 Given
Beale's view of common law, it followed that "the chief task of the
Conflict of Laws [is] to determine the place where a right arose and
Although Beale saw a role for
the law that created it." 9
instrumentalism in defining rights, 2 instrumentalism had no place
in Beale's choice of law scheme: courts were to find the rights that
had "vested" upon the occurrence of specified events and to enforce
those vested rights.2 '
Beale's theories came under almost immediate attack from the
followers of the emerging legal realist movement,2 2 but it was not
until Brainerd Currie developed his brand of governmental interest
analysis that Beale's "vested rights" theory had a serious choice of
law competitor. While other scholars developed complex multifactored analyses of choice of law problems, 3 Currie's method,
like Beale's, generated definitive answers to choice of law questions,
a feature that contributed in large measure to the popularity of
24
governmental interest analysis.
H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 48 (1935).
at 64.
20 For instance, Beale wrote that "[e]ach generation of men has its own mental as
well as physical ways, its own solution of the problems of life, its own criteria of
justice and social need; and these mental characteristics necessarily color its
understanding of its legal system." Id. at 49.
21 Lea Brilmayer has observed that Beale's vested rights approach lost its
intellectual foundation when the Supreme Court decided Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). As Brilmayer points out, the First Restatement's vested rights
approach requiredjudges to determine when a tort claim or a contract claim "vested."
See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 36. States might, of course, differ on the elements
necessary to establish a tort or contract claim. How then was ajudge to decide where
rights had vested? By looking to the general common law, which in Beale's view had
an existence independent of the laws of the several states. See BEALE, supra note 18,
at 29-32. The Supreme Court, however, discredited that view in Erie. See id. at 79
("'The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or
not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State ....
").
I See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critiqueofthe Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv.
173, 192-93 (1933) (arguing for a results-oriented rather than a rights-based test);
Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457,
484 (1924) (arguing that the law of a given state may only affect the relation between
litigants and cannot itself be enforced beyond its boundaries).
" Professors Elliot Cheatham and Willis Reese pioneered this method of analysis.
See Elliot E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 959,981 (1952) (identifying multiple factors to be considered in choice of law
determinations); see also Cavers, supra note 22, at 192-93 (same); Robert A. Leflar,
Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 279 (1966)
(same); Leflar, supra note 5, at 1586-88 (same).
24 Indeed, the definitive answers generated by governmental interest analysis have
18 1 JOSEPH
19 Id.
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Currie's approach to choice of law was purely instrumental. He
argued that courts should not try to identify pre-existing vested
rights, but instead should use choice of law decisions as a tool for
implementing state policy.25 Currie's critique of vested rights
never took deontological approaches to choice of law seriously. For
Currie, the vested rights theory was deficient because its supposed

led Lea Brilmayer to conclude that Currie, who ridiculed the idea that courts can
sensibly decide choice of law cases without investigating state policies and interests,
in fact endorsed jurisdiction-selecting rules. Brilmayer argues that the domiciliary
focus of Currie and his brand of governmental interest analysis leads to two choice
of law rules, applicable to all classes of disputes:
(1) If the parties have a common domicile, apply the law of the
common domicile; and
(2) If the parties do not have a common domicile, apply the law of the
forum.
Brilmayer correctly observes that these two rules do not depend on the content of the
law of any state. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 59.
The question, though, is whether Currie's approach was as wooden as Brilmayer
paints it to be. Currie was, as Brilmayer recognizes, consistently vague about the role
of non-domiciliary "interests" in the choice of law process. See id. at 61-62. Currie
was as much a salesman as a scholar, and when he sought to demonstrate the
simplicity of his approach, he frequently focused on cases in which the only state
interests he identified were interests in protecting domiciliaries. Currie's extensive
and widely read study of Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878) is a prime example.
See Brainerd Currie, MarriedWomen's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. CHm. L. REv. 227, 233 (1958) [hereinafter Currie, Married] (discussing
Massachusetts's interest in giving married women in the state special protection in
passing a law restricting their ability to form binding contracts), reprintedin BRAINERD
CURRE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 85 (1963) [hereinafter
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS]. But at other times, Currie explicitly recognized the
importance of non-domiciliary interests. See Brainerd Currie, Comment on Babcock
v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1237-41 (1963) (recognizing state interest in
expanding sources of recovery for caregivers in tort action since "liability insurance
rates in [the situs] were determined on the basis of claims arising from accidents in
[the situs]" and not the domicile, and traffic regulations at issue were intended to
apply within the enacting state). At other times, Currie implicitly recognized the
importance of non-domiciliary interests, as in his endorsement ofJustice Traynor's
opinion in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). See Brainerd Currie, The
DisinterestedThirdState, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,757-58 (1963) (commending
Judge Traynor's holding that Nevada law applied where a broad application of a
California statute which protected decedents' estates from false claims based on
alleged oral contracts to make wills was unnecessary to effectuate California legislative
policy, thereby avoiding a conflict between the states).
2 See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171, 173-74 [hereinafter Currie, Notes], reprinted in CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS, supra note 24, at 179, 179-82 (criticizing judges who "will address themselves
to metaphysical questions concerning the nature of law and its abstract operation in
space-matters remote from mundane policies and conflicts of interest-and will
evolve a set of rules for determining which state's law must, in the nature of things,
control").
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advantage-uniformity of result-would be gained only at an
"extravagant price": frequent frustration of state interests.2 6
In promoting advancement of state interests as his chief
instrumental goal, Currie's analysis largely ignored the interests of
private parties. 7 In his view, the laws of the several states took
account of the interests of the private parties; the role of courts in
choice of law cases was to decide whether a particular state interest,
which itself incorporated private interests, would be advanced by
application in the case at hand.28 Moreover, to the extent that he
recognized the importance of instrumental goals not embodied in
local substantive law-goals like facilitating planning or protecting
reasonable expectations-Currie suggested that interest analysis
could accommodate those goals if courts were to define state
interests narrowly when a broad reading would make planning
29
difficult or frustrate expectations.
In privileging forum interests over those of other states, Currie
argued that courts had neither the resources nor the legitimacy to
weigh the interests of sovereign states."0 Hence, in Currie's view,
the forum court should advance the interests of the forum state by
26 See Currie, Married,supra note 24, at 246. Currie also questioned whether the
vested rights system would, in practice, produce the uniformity cited by its
champions. See id.
2 See Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of
Laws, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 258, 280-84 (1961), reprinted in CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS,
supra note 24, at 584, 610 ("I can find no place in conflict-of-laws analysis for a
calculus of private interests. By the time the interstate plane is reached the resolution
of conflicting private interests has been achieved; it is subsumed in the statement of
the laws of the respective states.").
28See id. at 281.
2 See, e.g., id. at 270 (stating that if application of forum law insulating married
women from liability would frustrate expectations of out-of-state merchants, courts
might "define the scope of the state's interest more narrowly"); see also Currie, Notes,
supra note 25, at 180 (terming "sensible" a Nebraska decision to apply a foreign usury
statute to uphold a small loan contract whose terms would have been usurious under
the Nebraska statute, and indicating that the case demonstrated "restraint and
enlightenment in the determination of what state policy is and where state interests
lie" (citing Kinney Loan & Fin. Co. v. Summer, 65 N.W.2d 240 (Neb. 1954))).
o Currie wrote:
[A]ssessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests
of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a
political function of a very high order. This is a function which should not
be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function which the courts
cannot perform effectively, for they lack the necessary resources.
Currie, Notes, supra note 25, at 176.
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applying forum law "simply because a court should never apply any
other law except when there is a good reason for doing so.""1
B. Modern Instrumentalism and the Emergence of Game Theoy
While Currie wrote, and for two decades after his death, interest
analysis served as the focus for most choice of law scholarship.
Some scholars built upon Currie's insights, while others attacked
interest analysis with varying amounts of vitriol.5 2 The vast choice
of law literature in this period, however, overwhelmingly shared
Currie's instrumental approach to choice of law problems. A
number of scholars have explicitly labelled their own approaches
"functional" 3 or "pragmatic." 4 Proponents of choice of law rules
argued that rules would be easier to administer than Currie's ad hoc
interest analysis system."5 Alfred Hill, among the most thoughtful
of Currie's critics, questioned whether wholesale rejection of a
" Currie, Married, supra note 24, at 261.
32 Criticism of Currie's approach includesJohn H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protectingits Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 212 (1981) (calling for a
return to a "rule-oriented approach" to choice of law); Alfred Hill, The Judicial
Functionin Choice of Law, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1585, 1622 (1985) [hereinafter Hill, The
JudicialFunction] (labeling Currie's contention that only internal policies should be
looked to as a "prescription for irrationality"); Alfred Hill, GovernmentalInterest and
the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 479 (1960)
[hereinafter Hill, Governmental Interest] (arguing that Currie's view of the function of
the courts in conflict of law cases is too narrow); Willis L.M. Reese, ChiefJudge Fuld
and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 566 (1971) (advocating a rules-based
approach to choice of law); Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law, Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 315,333 (1972) (stating that developingrules shouldbe an objective
in choice of law jurisprudence).
At the same time, interest analysis served as the building block for the
comparative impairment approach developed by William Baxter and later embraced
by the California Supreme Court. See William F. Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); see also Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719,
723-24 (Cal. 1976) (adopting the Baxter approach to choice of law).
33 See, e.g., ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76-79, 492-95 (1965) (suggesting a functional approach that
will elaborate and apply the policies and purposes of specific rules and the legal
system as a whole); RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
48 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting that the "underlying policies" of choice of law are best
served by a functional approach or analysis).
' See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Renee G. Mayer, Toward a PragmaticSolution of
Choice-of-Law Problems-At the Interface of Substance andProcedure,74 Nw. U. L. REV. 781
passim (1979) (promoting a multistate rule that gives effect to "domestic interests of
the contact states without applying the domestic rule of either state").
5
5See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REv.
551, 644 (1968) ('[T]he present concern [in choice of law] is with high-volume
problems in the administrationofjustice, not in its inspired divination.").
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precedent-based system would produce sounder results than
incremental modification of traditional rules."6 Russell Weintraub
has emphasized that a choice of law system ought to prevent unfair
surprise to parties, in part at least to facilitate transaction plan7
ning.3

One of the principal instrumental objections to interest analysis
has been that Currie's approach takes too little account of multistate
policies.3 " Many pages have been written about how choice of law
analysis mightbetter incorporate consideration of multistate policies
rather than focus only on local policies of the sort Currie emphasized. In the latest chapter of the saga, two prominent scholars, Lea
Brilmayer and Larry Kramer, have suggested using game theory to
generate optimal choice of law results.3 9
Interest analysis rests on the premise that state courts have a
duty in conflicts cases to promote the policies embraced by their
state's legislature. Building on this premise, Currie concluded that
in any case where the forum state's policy would be advanced by
application of forum law, the forum court should apply forum law
regardless of any effect on the policies of other states. Using game
ISee Hill, The Judicial Function, supra note 32, at 1600-01 (arguing that
abandoning the traditional rules for "an essentially ad hoc" approach has brought
chaos to this area of law). See generally Hill, Governmental Interest, supra note 32, at
479-81 (questioning Currie's proposal that choice of law rules be scrapped).
17 In a section of his commentary dealing with unfair surprise, Weintraub writes:
Although a negligent defendant cannot reasonably argue that he would have
been more careful if he had known of the eventual resolution of a conflict
in favor of liability, it may be that he can reasonably argue that he did not
foresee any liability for his conduct and therefore failed to take out liability
insurance.... If so, then this should certainly be considered by the court.
WEmrntFAU, supra note 33, at 286 (citation omitted); see also id. at 391-93 (discussing
unfair surprise generally).
8Currie himself acknowledged the criticism: "I have been told that I give
insufficient recognition to governmental policies other than those which are
expressed in specific statutes and rules: the policy of promoting a general legal
order, that of fostering amicable relations with other states, that of vindicating
reasonable expectations, and so on." Currie, Notes, supra note 25, at 181. His
response did not deny the validity of the critique: "If this is so, it is not, I hope,
because of a provincial lack of appreciation of the worth of those ideals, but because
of a felt necessity to emphasize the obstacles which the present system interposes to
any intelligent approach to the problem." Id.
39 See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 145-89 (discussing at length the advantages of
cooperation); Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 273-76 (1991) (suggesting that "choice of law is a
variable-sum game in which some approaches to conflict resolution are better for
both states than others"); Kramer, supra note 1, at 340-44 (using game theory to
discuss reciprocity between states).
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theory, Brilmayer and Kramer establish that Gurrie's conclusion
does not follow from his premise.
Their point is intuitively simple: because each state cares about
the outcome of some cases more than it cares about the outcome of
others, all states would be better off if states could somehow trade
outcomes to maximize state policy objectives.4" Currie opposed
"weighing" of interests because he could find no appropriate scale
for measuring the balance.4 Brilmayer, by contrast, uses market
metaphors tojustify interest-weighing: in evaluating a choice of law
rule, "[e]ach state would have to compare its current state of affairs
against the state of affairs that would result if it adopted this rule,
including the gains realized through the cooperation of the other
42
states."
As Brilmayer explicitly recognizes, actual bargaining among the
fifty states would not be feasible as a means of resolving choice of
law problems. 4'
Brilmayer and Kramer turn instead to game
theory as proof that cooperation is possible even when explicit
bargaining proves impossible. Brilmayer notes in particular the
studies that have demonstrated the utility of a strategy called "titfor-tat" in maximizing mutual gains in the "prisoner's dilemma"
game.44 Under this approach, the task of choice of law scholars
becomes one of developing institutional arrangements that lead the
4

See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 170-71 (noting that potential gains from trade
do exist); Kramer, supra note 1, at 340 (asserting that choice of law can be a positivesum game if states adopt the appropriate choice of law framework). William Baxter
first introduced hypothetical negotiations between states as a means of resolving true
conflicts. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REv.
1, 10-18 (1963) (developing his comparative impairment variant on Currie's interest
analysis).
41 See Currie, Notes, supra note 25, at 176-77 (stating that assessment of competing
state values is a political, not ajudicia, function).
42 BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 171-72.
' See id. at 170 (stating that it is "ridiculous" to propose actual bargaining among
states). Thirty years earlier, Currie also considered, and rejected, multistate compacts
as a solution to choice of law problems: "No agreement would be very useful unless
substantially all of the states were parties to it, and the mechanics of achieving such
a many-sided agreement would be prohibitively cumbersome in comparison with
available and better ways of attaining the same end." Currie, Married,supra note 24,
at 265.
" BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 158 (discussing Robert Axelrod's description of
cooperative strategies in the prisoner's dilemma game that suggest the value of

reciprocity (citing ROBERT

AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 31

(1984)));

see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 341-43 (stating that the prisoner's dilemma is
analogous to the choice of law situation and that game theory would predict states
will arrive at cooperative solutions).
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states toward cooperative strategies that maximize achievement of
state policy objectives.4 5
Brilmayer suggests a new Restatement of Conflicts, which would
46
provide "'focal point solutions'" to coordination problems.
Apparently, Brilmayer envisions a Restatement that would, in effect,
mimic the market that would exist if states were capable of freely
bargaining about results in choice of law cases.4 7 She criticizes the
First and Second Restatements for seeking to "derive all of choice
of law from a single unifying intellectual principle" 8 rather than
adopting a more pragmatic approach that would "set out directly to
identify potential gains from cooperation and trade and to ensure
that all states stood to gain from the overall improvement in
utility.

" 49

Kramer takes this approach a step further by proposing a set of
"canons" for the resolution of conflicts." Kramer has explicitly
designed these canons "to capture ...
51
tion."

potential gains from coopera-

Thus, game theory extends the tradition, dominant since the rise
of the realists, of evaluating choice of law issues in instrumental
terms. Choice of law practices designed to capture "gains from
cooperation" do not rest on a foundation of "rights," but rather on
a desire to make sound social policy.
C. The Resuscitation of Rights Theory

After decades of instrumentalist hegemony in choice of law
scholarship, a number of recent works have advanced "rights-based"
choice of law theories.52 These rights-based theories tend to have

' Currie considered and rejected the possibility that reciprocity not based on
agreement could resolve true conflicts of interests between states. See Currie,
Maryied, supra note 24, at 263 (asserting that agreements between states involve
political considerations beyond the competence of courts).
' BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 185 (quoting THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY

OF CONFLICTS 57 (1980)).
47
See id. at 187 (suggesting that the "goal is to maximize state policy goals, and
to do so in a way that offers sufficient advantages to all states that each will gain by
adopting
the choice of law system").
48
Id. at 186-87.
49
1id. at 187.
'See Kramer, supra note 1, at 319-38 (proposing canons that reflect compromises
states would likely make with respect to issues of comparative impairment, substance/
procedure conflicts, contract conflicts, obsolete laws, and reliance interests).
51
52 Id. at 340.
See, e.g., BRLMAYER, supra note 1, at 219-21 (proposing a rights-based choice of
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a territorialist bent, but their advocates have not rushed to reinstate
Bealean dogmas.5
Instead, they have looked to other sources to
justify new territorial rules.
Douglas Laycock bases his territorial principles on the U.S.
Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause5 4 and, more
generally, on constitutional principles of federalism.5 5 He argues
that the "individual liberty policy" of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause prohibits discrimination against citizens of sister states, even
if the discrimination would have no discernible effect on consequentialist goals such as fostering national unity and interstate relations.5" For Laycock, the Constitution gives each state the power
to govern within its borders, and this "territorial allocation of state
authority is a fundamental constitutional principle, even though that
principle is not attributable to any particular constitutional
57
clause."
Lea Brilmayer, while using game theory to elaborate an
instrumentally based choice of law system, has simultaneously
argued that choice of law theory has overemphasized policy and
underemphasized rights and fairness.5" She attributes this failure
to consider rights to the consequentialist bent of the legal realists,
who believed that "rights" were nothing more than predictions
about the behavior of government officials.59 In Brilmayer's view,

law theory premised on the concept that a person becomes subject to the law of a
state when that person has some opportunity to influence the state's political
decisions); Dane, supra note 1, at 1243-45 (proposing that choice of law determinations be analyzed in terms of "vestedness," in which a court's role is to discover and
enforce whatever set of legal rights applies); Laycock, supra note 3, at 265 (linking
rights-based theory to Privileges and Immunities Clause).
'- See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supranote 1, at 203 ("Beale's theory of rights is inadequate
because it presupposes the answer to the important choice of law question, namely
what law is applicable?"); Laycock, supra note 3, at 322 (arguing that "Beale's rules
were crude" and that "a simple-minded Bealean approach will not work").
54 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, ci. 1.
5
See Laycock, supra note 3, at 261-66 (stating that Privileges and Immunities
Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of state citizenship in choice of law
decisions); id. at 315-22 (discussing more generally the Constitution's territorial
division of state authority).
' See id. at 265 ("Each unjustified discrimination against a citizen of a sister state
is a constitutional wrong to that citizen, regardless of the impact on national unity.").
5
" Id. at 318; see also id. (asserting that this power "is too deeply embedded in our
law to require justification").
m See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 155-75, 193-203 (developing a game theory
justification for territorial choice of law principles, and then criticizing consequentalist
thinking as she develops a rights-based theory of choice of law adjudication).
59
See id. at 196 (discussing argument that "rights" concepts were shorthand for
outcome prediction, in that rights had no existence apart from the behavior ofjudges
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however, the realists, with their emphasis on achieving instrumental
goals, ignored questions of fairness and desert in developing their
choice of law theories. She complains that because consequentialist
theories are forward-looking, they treat individuals as a means to an
end-the general good of society-without examining whether it
would be fair to force the individual to sacrifice her own interests
for the greater social good.6"
Unlike Laycock, however, Brilmayer is not content to use the
U.S. Constitution as the source from which she derives the rights on
which to base her choice of law theory. Instead, she turns to
political theory and argues that a person has a negative right to be
left alone by a state unless that person has had some opportunity61
through voice or exit-to influence the state's political decisions.
Thus, she asserts that an individual's domicile always has power to
regulate her behavior, but also concludes that territorial connecting
factors, if they are "purposeful" or "volitional," suffice to justify a
state in subjecting an individual to its laws.62 By contrast, Brilmayer
questions the fairness of imposing on an individual a conception of
substantive justice developed by a state with whom the individual
63
has had insufficient contact.

Whether the boomlet in rights theory among choice of law
scholars represents a lasting shift in direction remains to be seen.
That the boomlet developed at all, however, establishes a surprising
degree of uneasiness about instrumental theories.
II. THEORY IN THE COURTS: SIGNIFICANT
INFLUENCE OR LIP SERVICE?

A. Introduction

From reading judicial opinions and works of scholarship, one
could easily conclude that academic theory has been far more
influential in the choice of law area than in most other areas of law.
Judicial opinions involving choice of law issues are frequently laced
with citations to scholarly books and articles.' In many jurisdicin deciding choice of law cases).
' See id. at 202-03 ("A major problem with strictly consequentialist reasoning is
that there are strongly held moral intuitions that human beings... must be treated
as ends in themselves.").
61See id. at 218-21.
62
See id. at 220.
63 See id. at 219.
" The apparent influence of scholarship has extended even to courts not known

962

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:949

dons, no conflicts discussion would be complete without a citation
to the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Leading casebooks
are often organized not by subject matter but by academic theory,
highlighting the supposed importance of theory. 5 Leading scholars
in the field make it their business to track the adoption of one
66
theory or another by courts in different jurisdictions.
Has academic theory been as influential as the frequency of
citation would indicate? The question is ultimately unanswerable,
but I would suggest that, at least in many areas, citation to academic
theory has served more as window dressing than as a dispositive
factor in deciding choice of law cases. This Section explores the
role academic theory has played in choice of law decisions.
B. Consensual Transactions
1. Party Autonomy
Acceptance of party autonomy as a principle for resolving choice
of law problems is one of the major successes of modem conflicts
theory. The Second Restatement would give contracting parties
wide latitude to choose the law that will apply to the contract, so
long as the parties' choice would not be contrary to "fundamental
policy" 67 and the "choice" was not unilaterally imposed by a party

for innovation. For instance, in Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63
(S.D. 1992), the South Dakota Supreme Court purported to abandon the lex loci
delicti rule in an opinion citing three books on choice of law and eleven law review
articles. Some courts have cited academic work even when they have retained
traditional choice of law approaches. Thus, in Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 581
So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1991), the Alabama Supreme Court cited one book and five law
review articles in an opinion rejecting modern approaches to choice of law problems.
6 See LEA BRILMAYER & JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES AND
MATERIALS 221-345 (3d ed. 1990) (surveying variety of choice of law theories,
including interest analysis and comparative impairment); ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 188-358 (4th ed. 1987) (surveying interest analysis theory and
alternative modern approaches to conflicts).
"See, e.g., Herma H. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34
MERCER L. REV. 521, 591-92 (1983) (setting out a chart listing choice of law theories
adopted
by the various state courts).
67
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Entitled "Law of
the State Chosen by the Parties," the section provides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one
which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is
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with greater bargaining power." A wide variety of other scholars,
writing both before and after promulgation69 of the Second Restatement, have also endorsed party autonomy.

one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in
their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties
or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for
the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of
the particular issue and which, under the rule of sec. 188,
would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference
is to the local law of the state of the chosen law.
Id.
68 See id. § 187 cmt. (b).
9
See, e.g., Cook, supranote 22, at 485; Willis L.M. Reese, Power of Partiesto Choose

Law Governing Their Contract,54 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 49, 50 (1960) (assertion
by the reporter for the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws that the only practical
way of achieving predictability in conflict of law situations is to allow the parties to
contract in advance what law will govern); Donald T. Trautman, Some Notes on the
Theorj of Choice of Law Clauses, 35 MERCER L. REv. 535, 537 (1984) (suggesting that
parties' stipulations regarding which law will govern a transaction is a "widespread
practice... in a variety of transactions"); Hessel E. Yntema, Contractand Conflict of
Laws: 'Autonomy' in Choice of Law in the United States, 1 N.Y. L.F. 46, 65-66 (1955)
(asserting that agreements of parties regarding the law to govern the agreement
should be given legal sanction); Max Rheinstein, Book Review, 15 U. CHI. L. REV.
478, 485-87 (1948) (reviewingJOHN D. FALcONBRIDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF

LAws (1947)) (disagreeing with Falconbridge's argument that parties' stipulations as
to what law will apply are invalid as a matter of law).
Even scholars skeptical of the Restatement position suggest that it does not go
far enough to adopt a "rule of validation" even when the parties have not chosen a
law that would validate the contract. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 33, at 375 ("[E]xactly
the same considerations that would move a court to give effect to the parties'
stipulation ofvalidating law should move that same court to choose the validating law
whether the parties have done so or not.").
Although Brainerd Currie did not write extensively about party autonomy, what
he did write suggests that he was one of the few "modern" scholars who lacked
enthusiasm for party autonomy. Currie wrote:
The rule that the law intended by the parties shall govern... accords to the
incapacitated party the power to contract out of her disability-a privilege
she may be assumed not to enjoy in a purely domestic case; and the result
is pro tanto the subversion of the interest of the state to which she belongs.
Similarly, a rule permitting the selection of the law of any state having a
connection (in terms of the given factors) with the case, so long as that law
gives validity to the contract, must to some extent impair the apparent
interest of a state which has, and has asserted, an interest in protecting the
incapacitated party.
Currie, Married,supra note 24, at 248.
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Courts have shown affinity for the Restatement formulation, and
for party autonomy principles in general, even when the result is
displacement of forum law."° In recent years, those few cases in
which courts have refused to honor choice of law clauses have
involved contracts of adhesion or areas subject to extensive state
regulation-particularly franchise agreements.71 In franchise cases,
courts have typically applied franchise-protection statutes of the
state in which the franchise is located even if the franchise agreement specifies application of the law of another state, and have
72
cited the Restatement formulation to justify the result.

Has choice of law scholarship generated the modern willingness
to enforce choice of law clauses? Cause and effect is difficult to
prove, especially in light of arguments by some scholars that
American courts have long endorsed party autonomy.7 ' But choice
of law clauses were a less common feature of the legal landscape
"'See, e.g., Broadway & Seymour, Inc. v. Wyatt, No. 91-2345, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21736,-at *7-*8, *19 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1991) (citing Second Restatement of
Conflicts § 187 and applying Florida law); World Plan Executive Council v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 810 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (citing § 187 and applying Swiss law);
Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1149-53 (Cal. 1992) (citing
§ 187 and holding Hong Kong law applicable to contract).
7' A recent case purporting to deny effect to a choice of law clause involving a
classic contract of adhesion-a car rental agreement-actually presented a false
conflict. In Van Vonno v. Hertz Corp., 841 P.2d 1244 (Wash. 1992), a car rented in
Oregon collided in Washington with an uninsured vehicle. The rental contract
specified that the rental company, Hertz, would provide the minimum uninsured
motorist coverage required by the state in which the accident occurred. See id. at
1246. A Washington statute required uninsured motorist coverage, but the statute's
terms applied only to vehicles registered or principally garaged in Washington.
Hence, Hertz argued that no uninsured motorist coverage was required. See id. The
court said it would not honor the choice of law clause, and applied Oregon law to
give the car renter relief against Hertz. See id. In fact, however, both Oregon and
Washington had policies requiring uninsured motorist coverage. See id. at 1247.
Moreover, the parties had not relied on application of Washington law, since the
accident could have occurred in any state. Van Vonno thus cannot reasonably be read
as a rejection of party autonomy.
7 See Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 132-33 (7th Cir. 1990)
(applying Indiana franchise law to protect Indiana franchisee despite choice of law
clause calling for application of New York law). In Rutter v. BX of Tri-Cities, Inc.,
806 P.2d 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), the court applied Washington's "franchisee bill
of rights" despite a choice of law clause selecting California law. See id. at 1268. The
court cited comment g of § 187 of the Second Restatement in its decision, which
states that "[A] fundamental policy may be embodied in a statute which makes one
or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is designed to protect a person against the
oppressive use of superior bargaining power." Id.
73 See, e.g., ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 467-68
(1962) ("American law, like the laws of other countries, has always permitted parties
to a contract to 'legislate' ... and expressly to stipulate the applicable law.").
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until the last few decades, at least in part, one suspects, out of fear
that they would not be enforced. The First Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws, largely drafted by Beale, included no provision on
party autonomy, and Beale had no use for the concept. Beale's
treatise stated that the "fundamental objection" to party autonomy
"in point of theory is that it involves permission to the parties to do
a legislative act,"74 and went on to conclude that because courts
would be unable to set predictable limits on party autonomy,
lawyers would be unable to draft choice of law clauses with any
confidence that they would be enforced. 7' Beale himself recognized that his own antipathy to choice of law clauses was not
universally shared by courts, 7' but distinguished judges (Learned
Hand among them) shared Beale's view that choice of law clauses
should not be enforced.77
At the very least, modem choice of law scholarship has swept
away the conceptualist thinking that condemned choice of law
clauses as impermissible private legislation, 78 making it easier for
parties to draft choice of law clauses with greater confidence in
their enforcement.7 9
' 2 BEALE, supra note 18, at 1079.
75 See id. at 1086.
76 See id. at 1080-81 (discussing cases in which courts were willing to enforce
choice of law clauses established by a bona fide agreement of the parties).
7 In E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931), for instance,
a court composed of Judges Learned Hand, Thomas Swan, and Augustus Hand
refused to enforce a choice of law clause in a shipping agreement. Judge Learned
Hand wrote:
People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place; they may
of course incorporate any provisions they wish into their agreements-a
statute like anything else-and when they do, courts will try to make sense
out of the whole, so far as they can. But an agreement is not a contract,
except as the law says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to pull on
one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation, and the parties
have nothingwhatever to do with that; no more than with whether their acts
are torts or crimes.
Id. at 117.
' Willis Reese, the reporter for the Second Restatement, offered the classic
response to the view that choice of law clauses constitute improper private legislation:
The forum must decide in each case what law shall be applied to determine
the validity of a contract and the rights created thereby. There is nothing
to prevent the forum from adopting a choice of law rule that the governing
law shall, in the ordinary case, be that chosen by the parties. When the
forum adopts such a rule, the chosen law is applied not because the parties
are legislators but simply because this is the result required by the choice
of law rule of the forum.
Reese, supra note 69, at 51.
79 Russell Weintraub, in expressing concern about inadvertent stipulations to apply
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2. Contracts Without Expectations
Party expectations may be relevant even when contracts do not
include choice of law clauses, and the "presumption of validity"
endorsed by scholars, 80 and somewhat less regularly by courts, 8
recognizes the importance of satisfying those expectations. In many
contract cases, however, the parties have no discernible expectations
about resolution of particular issues. Neither party autonomy rules
nor a presumption of validity are useful in resolving these cases.
In false conflict cases, courts have little need to focus on party
expectations, because these cases are easily resolvable even if the
parties never considered the matter at hand. Thus, when an Ohio
insured's executor sought to recover under the uninsured motorist

law that would invalidate the contract, has suggested that "choice-of-law clauses are
becoming ubiquitous boiler plate in commercial contracts." WEINTRAUB, supra note
33, at 373. Proponents of party autonomy have argued that reduced litigation is an
important reason for enforcing choice of law clauses. See Reese, supranote 69, at 51
("[T]o the extent that the parties can and do choose the governing law, the court is
spared the pains of decision. This is not an insignificant consideration in an area
such as contracts, where choice of the governing law may present many difficulties.").
o The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides:
Parties entering a contract will expect at the very least, subject perhaps to
rare exceptions, that the provisions of the contract will be binding upon
them. Their expectations should not be disappointed by application of the
local law rule of a state which would strike down the contract or a provision
thereof unless the value of protecting the expectations of the parties is
substantially outweighed in the particular case by the interest of the state
with the invalidating rule in having this rule applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. (b) (1971); see also
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 73, at 465-485 (discussing the "Rule of Validation");
WEINTRAUB, supra note 33, at 387 (stating that a "rebuttable presumption of validity
has the merit of focusing on a policy that all states share-making commercial
transactions convenient and reliable"). Of course, as the Restatement provision
indicates, the "presumption" gives way in the face of strong public policies.
In endorsing the presumption of validity, these scholars have rejected the
conceptualism of Beale illustrated by the following passage:
The rule is based on the necessity of some law to raise an obligation
between parties to a promise; of this necessity there can be no question. If
two parties agree between themselves to do a thing, their agreement does
not and cannot create any binding obligation to do it ....
It is only when
the law affixes to the promise a legal obligation of performance that the
parties can be said to have entered into a contract in a true sense. In the

legal sense, all rights must be created by some law.
2 BEALE, supra note 18, at 1090.
" A number of recent cases have applied some version of a rule of validation in

holding insurance companies liable to indemnify insureds against punitive damage
awards despite statutes which, in some states, prohibit insurance against punitive
damage claims. See cases cited infra notes 83-85.
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provisions of the deceased-insured's Ohio insurance policy, even a
West Virginia court had little difficulty rejecting the insured's
argument that, because the accident occurred in West Virginia, he
was entitled to the more generous uninsured motorist coverage
mandated by West Virginia law. 2 But in other cases, especially
insurance contract cases (which are among the most frequently
litigated contract cases to raise choice of law problems), courts often
invent party expectations to justify particular results.
Consider three recent cases-Meijer, Inc. v. GeneralStarIndemnity
Co.,"3 Stonewall Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.,84 and American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Products
Co. 8 -raising the same question: Must an insurer indemnify the
insured party for punitive damages when the insurance contract
includes no exception for punitive damages, but where the law of
the state in which the insured risk was located prohibits contracts
to indemnify against punitive damages?
In Meijer and American Home Assurance, the courts held the
insurer liable on the contract; in Stonewall, the court excused the
insurer from liability. More interesting than the results, however,
is the disparity in treatment of party expectations. In Meijer, the
court simply assumed that the parties expected that punitive
damages would be covered by the policy."
In American Home
Assurance, the court relied in part on a rule construing ambiguous
insurance policies against the insurer,8 7 and then cited the Restatement in support of a rule of validation. 8 By contrast, in Stonewall,
the court concluded that insured and insurer would have expected
' See Nadler v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. W. Va. 1990).
Although the Nadler court did quote from another case which mentioned the
"reasonable expectation[s] of the parties," id. at 297, the court held that "West
Virginia's public policy regarding uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is
not applicable to the dispute at bar," id. at 299.

a 826 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
a 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713 (Ct. App. 1993).
s 743 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
a The Meijer court wrote:
To hold that punitive damages are not recoverable would create, in
effect, an exclusionfor which the parties did not negotiate and allow insurance
companies to collect premiums for coverage of a risk that they voluntarily
assumed and then escape their obligation to pay on a claim by a mere
judicial declaration that the contract is void by reason of public policy.
Meijer, 826 F. Supp. at 247 (emphasis added).
' See American Home Assurance, 743 S.W.2d at 698-99.
88 See id. at 700-01.
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that the invalidating law of the state in which the risk was located
would apply to the insurance contract. 9
An exclusion of coverage for punitive damages would have
resolved the question finally, express inclusion of coverage for
punitive damages would at least have made party expectations clear,
and would have eliminated an attractive argument for absolving the
insurer of liability.9" That none of the contracts in any of the three
cases addressed indemnification for punitive damages suggests that
none of the parties had considered punitive damages when the
insurance contracts were drafted and that none of them had formed
significant expectations about the insurer's liability for punitive
damages.
It should come as no surprise that the courts in these cases
failed to acknowledge the absence of party expectations. Satisfying
party expectations provides a neutral principle for resolving choice
of law disputes, a principle (like party autonomy, which is but an
application of the principle of satisfying party expectations) that
facilitates planning and reduces the need for courts to choose
between conflicting state policies. When parties have no expectations-when they have not planned for the eventuality that has
occurred-the case is not, for choice of law purposes, significantly
different from a tort case. And in many tort cases, as we shall see,
courts find little reason to depart from forum law, or from their
own predilections about the case at hand.
In each of the three punitive damage coverage cases the courts
applied forum law.9 In Meijer, the Michigan federal court applied
59

The Stonewall court wrote:
[W]e believeJohnson Controls and its insurers would reasonably expect not
only that the corporation's liability to a third party might be governed by
the law of a state with significant interests at stake, but that Johnson
Controls's right to indemnity for such a claim might also be governed by
that state's law.
Stonewall, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720.
90 Cf. Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 61, 6465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (suggesting that the parties' failure to include a
choice of law clause indicated that uniform interpretation of the contract was not a
conscious goal of the contracting parties), af/'d, 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993).
91 Moreover, from reading the opinions, one gets the definite sense that the
opinion-writing judge in each case considered forum law to be better than the
alternative. Indeed, in Meijerand American Home Assurance, the court virtually made
up forum law that had not been developed in previous cases. In Meijer, the court
conceded that no Michigan case had squarely decided whether an insured would be
entitled to recover punitive damages for an insurer and ultimately decided that no
Michigan policy prevented recovery. See Meijer, 826 F. Supp. at 247. Had the district
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Michigan law permitting punitive damage claims against the insurer
even though the insurance policy, issued in Michigan, covered an
Ohio risk.92 In Stonewall, the California state court applied
California law prohibiting indemnification for punitive damage
claims even though the policy covered a corporate insured headquartered in Wisconsin, where indemnification was permissible."
The risk that led to liability was located in California. 4 Finally, in
American Home Assurance, the Texas state court applied Texas law
permitting indemnification when the risk was located in Texas, but
the policy was issued by the insurer in New York, which prohibits
95
indemnification.

Judges have demonstrated a more general tendency to follow
their own predilections, or to apply forum law, when the expectations of the contracting parties are unclear. Consider another
contemporary issue: What liability do insurers bear for the
insured's environmental cleanup costs? Courts in two recent choice
of law cases-Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers'
Association Insurance Co."6 and Potomac Electric Power Co. v. California Union Insurance Co. 9 --have construed insurance contracts
which arguably insured against environmental torts by applying
forum law. Moreover, in the Potomac case, the forum essentially had
no developed law, so the judge developed it in deciding the case.9"
In Gilbert Spruance, the insured, a Pennsylvania paint manufacturer, sought to recover from the insurer for the cost of cleaning up
NewJersey sites at which paint wastes had been dumped, despite a
judge believed it inappropriate to permit indemnification for punitive damages, she
could easily have construed Michigan law to be identical to Ohio law, and have
concluded that Michigan public policy prevented indemnification. See alsosupranote
86 (quoting from the opinion in which the court indicates its disapproval of a rule
that would prevent indemnification).

Similarly, the court in American Home Assurance, after deciding that Texas law
should apply, treated as a question of first impression whether Texas public policy
prevented indemnification for punitive damages. See American Home Assurance, 743
S.W.2d at 697, 703-05. As in Meijer, if the court believed it inappropriate to permit
indemnification, the court could have decided, as a matter of Texas law, that
indemnification was impermissible.
See Meijer, 826 F. Supp. at 246-47.
s See Stonewall, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718-20.
14See id. at 718-19.
95
See American Home Assurance, 743 S.W.2d at 696-98.
603 A.2d 61 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.), aff'd, 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993).
1991).

9777 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C.
See id. at 974.
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pollution exclusion clause in the insurance contract." Under the
law of Pennsylvania, where the wastes were generated and the
insurance policy was issued, the pollution exclusion clause would
have been construed to cover discharge of waste materials 00 The
court, however, applied NewJersey law, which would have construed
the pollution exclusion clause more narrowly.' 0 1
In Potomac Electric, the insured, an electric utility company,
deposited wastes in Maryland. When the insured was required to
clean up the site,10 2 it sought to recover on an insurance policy
covering "'damages' arising from the destruction of property."'
Under Maryland law, as construed by the Fourth Circuit, environmental cleanup costs were not "damages" within the meaning of the
policy."l 4 The court, unlike the court in Gilbert Spruance, chose
not to apply the law of the state in which the environmental wastes
were discharged, but instead applied the law of the District of
Columbia, as the insured's principal place of business. 0 5 Since
there were no District of Columbia cases on the issue, the court
applied "general principles of insurance contract interpretation
existing under District of Columbia law"" 6 to conclude that the
insurer was liable under the policy.
Thus, although the two courts purported to apply different
choice of law rules-the place of the dumpsite in Gilbert Spruance,
and the place of the insured's principal place of business in
Potomac-in both cases the court applied the law of the forum (as
creatively constructed by the court) and permitted recovery against
the insurer.
Taken as a group, these recent cases suggest that whatever
courts say about choice of law, once they become satisfied that no
party expectations will be frustrated, courts are likely to apply
forum law or what they regard as the "better" law.

99 See Gilbert, 603 A.2d at 62.
1oo See id.
1o' See id. at 62, 65.
" See Potomac Electric, 777 F. Supp. at 970-71.
03

1

104

Id. at 971.
See id. at 972 (citing Maryland Casualty v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352-54

(4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988)).
105See id. at 973.
0
' 6 Id. at 974.
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C. Torts

Tort cases figured prominently in the choice of law revolution
of the 1960s and early 1970s. Guest statutes and wrongful death
limitations were the backdrop against which courts purported to
embrace new choice of law theories.1 °7 A generation later, it is
worth considering the impact of choice of law theory on decided
tort cases.
1. What Courts Say
Although scholars have often emphasized that one can more
reliably derive choice of law principles from the results courts reach
than from the language they use, 0 8 judicial language remains of
some value in measuring the influence of choice of law theory. To
the extent that language in opinions is indicative, neither modern
rights theory nor modem consequentialism, based largely on game
10 9
theory, has yet had any impact on choice of law practice.
107For cases applying guest statutes, see Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky.
1972) (applying Kentucky guest statute to case involving automobile accident in
Ohio); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972) (applying Ontario guest
statute on behalf of deceased Ontario resident, based on rules that the place of injury
is the substantive law that should govern unless the host-driver and guest-passenger
are domiciled in the same state); Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969)
(applying New York guest statute to case involving Michigan automobile accident);
Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965) (finding Colorado guest statute
applicable even though parties are domiciled in New York); Babcock v.Jackson, 191
N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (applying New York guest statute to case involving automobile
accident in Ontario); Cipollav. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970) (utilizing Delaware
guest statute to decide case brought by Pennsylvania resident based on Delaware
accident); see also Macey v. Rozbicki, 221 N.E.2d 380 (N.Y. 1966) (accepting choice of
law principles established in Babcock).
Wrongful death decisions include Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1973) (holding that New York choice of law rules mandated application of New York
wrongful death limitation to case in which death occurred in Massachusetts), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974)
(allowing application of California wrongful death limitation in suit brought by
Mexican citizens); Miller v. Miller, 237 N.E.2d 877 (N.Y. 1968) (mandatinguse of New
York wrongful death limitations where accident occurred in Maine and defendant
resided in Maine at time of the accident); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d
526 (N.Y. 1961) (rejecting application of Massachusetts wrongful death limitation to
case decided under Massachusetts negligence law).
108 See e.g., EHRENZWEIG, supra note 73, at 311-16, 323-26 (arguing that dogmatic
assertions of doctrine have long obscured the pattern of results reached by courts).
"0With respect to rights theory, for instance, no reported case has yet cited Lea
Brilmayer's 1989 article, Rights, Fairness,and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989),
or the corresponding chapter in her book, Conflict of Laws: Foundationsand Future
Directions,see Brilmayersupra note 1, at 191-230. Similarly, no reported case has cited
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Whether the passage of time will bring an increase in citation to this
work remains to be seen.
Interest analysis has had more apparent impact on judicial
discourse, but few courts have endorsed Currie's choice of law
approach wholeheartedly. In the District of Columbia, regarded as
a citadel of interest analysis, recent cases have suggested using
interest analysis to identify the jurisdiction with the most significant
relationship to the dispute l ° and have engaged in interest weighing"-uses of interest analysis Currie would have abhorred. In
one case, a District of Columbia federal court, while endorsing
interest analysis, also used renvoi principles 112 to justify application of forum law."' In New Jersey, another supposed stronghold
of interest analysis, a recent opinion not only weighed the interests
of two states, but went so far as to say that New Jersey's "status as
the forum state is irrelevant."' 14 Similarly, in its most recent
choice of law decision, the New York Court of Appeals has indicated
that in true conflict cases, the law of the situs of the tort should
generally be applied as a "tie breaker" in order to rebut any
"inference that the forum State is merely protecting its own
domiciliary or favoring its own law."' 15 Other recent New York

Douglas Laycock's rights-oriented choice of law work, see Laycock, supra note 3, and
only one 1989 case has cited Perry Dane's article, see Dane supra note 1. Similarly
ignored have been the game theory discussions offered by Professor Brilmayer, see
Brilmayer supra note 1, and Professor Larry Kramer, see Kramer supra note 1.
Given the recency of this work, the lack of citation is not surprising. It seems
clear, however, that the new scholarship has not taken the judiciary by storm.
11 See Moore v. Ronald Hsu Constr. Co., 576 A.2d 734, 737 (D.C. 1990)
(endorsing an approach that identifies thejurisdiction with the greatest relationship
to the dispute (citing Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant, 566 A.2d 31, 40-41 (D.C.

1989))).
III See id. ("As applied to corporations chartered by Maryland and residing in that
state, clearly [Maryland's interest in permitting corporate officers to reject workmens'
compensation coverage] is paramount to the District's general interest in enforcing
the exclusivity of its compensation remedy.").
112Renvoi principles suggest that when a state's choice of law principles refer to
the law of another state, the court should look not just to the local law of the other
state, but also to the other state's choice of law rules. For a general discussion, see
Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979 (1991).
" See Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 1991 U.S Dist. LEXIS 140, at *11
(D.D.C.Jan. 7, 1991) (considering whether "jurisdiction whose law we are urged to
apply would have applied that law had the suit originally been brought in that state"),
dismissed, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2193 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1991).
14 O'Connor v. Busch Gardens, 605 A.2d 773, 775 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) (holding that Virginia law applied to accident involving NewJersey resident at
a Virginia amusement park).
115 Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 281-82 (N.Y. 1993) (applying
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cases have transformed interest analysis into a set of jurisdictionselecting rules of the sort Currie deplored." 6
In other jurisdictions, courts have considered and explicitly
rejected interest analysis in favor of other approaches to choice of
law. 117 Counting cases in which courts have endorsed interest
analysis would, however, significantly understate Currie's influence
on choice of law discourse. A number of courts recognize Currie's
most basic principle: the forum court should always apply its own
law until one of the parties advances a reason for departing from
forum law."'
Even when courts purport to use some other
framework for deciding choice of law cases, assessing state policies
and purposes is often a critical step in the process. g Indeed,
Missouri statutes to accident suffered by Missouri resident in Missouri while working
with equipment manufactured in New York).
116In Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985), the Court
of Appeals, while purporting to engage in interest analysis, announced that when
conduct-regulating rules are involved, the law of the place of the tort should generally
govern, but when loss-allocating rules are involved, the law of the parties' domicile
should govern. See id. at 684-85.
Recent cases have embraced the language of Schultz, or the choice of law rules
announced earlier in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, while purporting to
engage in interest analysis. See Mascarella v. Brown, 813 F. Supp. 1015, 1018-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (indicating that interest analysis is appropriate method for deciding
case and then distinguishing conduct-regulating from loss-allocating rules (citing
Schultz and Neumeier)); Fiske v. Church of St. Mary of the Angels, 802 F. Supp. 872,
877 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that "the law of the jurisdiction having the most
significant contacts and the greatest interest in the litigation will be applied," and that
New York labor code provision is conduct-regulating and should apply to New York
accident); In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 566-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing
Neumeierand Schultz); Reale v. Herco, Inc., 589 N.Y.S.2d 502, 505-06 (App. Div. 1992)
(applying law of situs of tort after citing Neumeierrule indicating that, absent special
circumstances, situs law should be applied when parties are from different states);
Salsman v. Barden & Robeson Corp., 564 N.Y.S.2d 546,548 (App. Div. 1990) (stating
that New York labor law provision is conduct-regulating and should not, therefore,
apply to Massachusetts construction accident); LaForge v. Normandin, 551 N.Y.S.2d
142, 142-43 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that loss-allocating rule of situs should generally
apply when parties are from different jurisdictions).
"" See Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63, 67 (S.D. 1992)
(rejecting interest analysis in favor of Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws and
indicating that interest analysis "has received little support from the courts"); Fitts v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So.2d 819, 821-23 (Ala. 1991) (adhering to the
First Restatement of Conflict of Laws approach).
ns See, e.g., Robinson v. U-Haul Co., 785 F. Supp. 1378, 1379 (D. Alaska 1992)
("[I]t seems clear that the Alaska courts will apply the law of Alaska unless there is a
substantial reason to apply the law of another state.").
'9 See e.g., Allison v. ITE Imperial Corp., 928 F.2d 137, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1991)
(analyzing respective policies of Tennessee and Mississippi in course of an opinion
embracing Second Restatement of Conflicts); Lee v. Delta Air Lines, 797 F. Supp.
1362, 1368-71 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (analyzing respective interests of Texas and Florida
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section 6 of the Second Restatement itself contemplates evaluation
of state interests in determining which state has the most significant
2
relationship with the issue at hand.1 1
Of those courts that have decided choice of law cases in recent
years, by far the largest number have endorsed the Second Restatement of Conflicts. 21 As others have noted, however, this judicial
affinity for the Second Restatement may reflect nothing more than
the open-endedness of the Second Restatement's formulations; a
court can reach virtually any result in any choice of law case and
find some support for the result in the Second Restatement. 22 The
predominance of Second Restatement citations, then, probably
reflects less the victory of a particular theory than the preference of
common-law courts for making choice of law decisions without the
constraint of a comprehensive theory.
Examination of judicial language reveals much less about law
than examination of result. In many choice of law cases, any of
several competing approaches would lead to the same result. In
cases like these, a judicial statement that the court has adopted a
particular approach is not entitled to much weight. Consider two
recent cases: Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 123 in which the
court purported to apply the First Restatement's lex loci approach,
and O'Connor v. Busch Gardens,124 in which the court purported to

in opinion endorsing Second Restatement of Conflicts), vacated, 988 F.2d 1209 (5th
Cir. 1993).
120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b), (c) (1971).
121Others have noted the widespread adoption of the Second Restatement. See,
e.g., Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1046
(1987) ("The Second Restatement is the most popular of the modern choice of law
theories."). For some recent cases purporting to follow the Restatement, see Allison,
928 F.2d 137, 143-45 (5th Cir. 1991) (following the Second Restatement in applying
Tennessee law to an electrical fire caused by a defective circuit-breaker involving a
Mississippi resident in Tennessee); California Union Ins. Co. v. Therm-o-Disc, Inc.,
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 239, at *18-*21 (Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1993) (applying Second
Restatement in ruling that Michigan law governs in Ohio proceeding); Brazones v.
Prothe, 489 N.W.2d 900, 904 (S.D. 1992) (applying Second Restatement in
determining that South Dakota law should apply to Iowa petroleum storage tank
explosion involving South Dakota resident); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59
(Tenn. 1992) (following Second Restatement in decision to apply Tennessee law to
scuba diving accident suffered by Tennessee resident in Arkansas).
11 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and
Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466 (1991) (stating that the Second
Restatement's "undirected, multifactor analysis invites post-hoc rationalizing of
intuitions about the applicable law").
123 606 A.2d 295 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 612 A.2d 257 (Md. 1992).
124605 A.2d 773 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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use interest analysis. In Black, residents of Virginia and the District
of Columbia brought an action in Maryland against a Virginia bus
company for injuries suffered in a New Jersey accident that
occurred while plaintiffs were passengers on a trip to Atlantic
City.'25 After a jury returned substantial verdicts in favor of
plaintiffs, the bus company sought reduction of the jury's award
pursuant to Maryland's $350,000 "cap" on noneconomic damages. 126 The court, purporting to apply the First Restatement's lex
loci rule, held the cap inapplicable because New Jersey, not
Maryland, was the situs of the accident. 12 Of course, the court
could have reached precisely the same result using interest analysis
by concluding that Maryland had no interest in limiting the
passengers' recovery against a Virginia corporation.
Conversely, in O'Connorv. Busch Gardens, the court, purportedly

applying interest analysis, held that Virginia's contributory negligence rule should apply in an action for injuries suffered by New
Jersey tourists while visiting a Virginia amusement park. 2 8 It
ought to be obvious that the court would have reached the same
result had it applied the First Restatement's "place of the wrong"
approach. Black and O'Connorillustrate the general problem: even
fundamentally different approaches sometimes generate identical
results, and when they do, one cannot be sure how committed the
court is to the particular approach it has nominally embraced.
Moreover, not all cases in which courts purport to apply foreign
law are cases in which the supposed choice of law has any impact on
the court's decision. Thus, a court may, for whatever reason,
choose to apply foreign law, and then conclude that foreign law and
forum law are equivalent. 129 Or, the court might suggest that
foreign law is applicable after applying other principles, only
tangentially related to choice of law, which mandated a particular
decision.

130

125See Black,
126 See id.

606 A.2d at 296.

127 See id. at 300-05.
128 Se, O'Connor,605 A.2d at 775.
" See Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 731 F. Supp.
57, 64 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Florida law, even though parties have agreed that
Massachusetts law should govern, and concluding that Florida law, like Massachusetts
law, would follow the American Law Institute's Proposed Article 4A of the Uniform
Commercial Code).
' See California Union Ins. Co. v. Therm-o-Disc, Inc., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
239, at *12-*16 (Ct. App. Jan. 21,1993) (concluding that trial court erred in applying
Ohio law instead of Michigan law, and that the requirements of full faith and credit
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The point, then, is thatjudicial language purporting to embrace
one or another approach to choice of law may be little more than
post hoc rationalization. Language alone is a poor indicator of the
method the court actually used to reach its result. Let us turn,
then, to an examination of case results to see what patterns have
emerged."1'
As a starting point, we may assume that a court
generally applies its own law unless confronted with a reason to
apply some other law. We can then examine cases to see what
circumstances are present in those cases where courts have chosen
not to apply their own law. The focus will be on recent cases,
decided since the beginning of 1990."32 After demonstrating that
in some tort cases courts have a sense of conflicts justice, I hope to
show that in many other tort cases ordinary conflicts principles are
irrelevant to the results courts reach.
2. Parties' Agreement to Application of Foreign Law
One reason courts depart from forum law is that the parties
themselves have agreed, at some stage before or during the
proceeding, that a foreign state's law should apply. So long as
courts permit parties to settle cases, there appears to be little reason
to prevent them from narrowing the issues before the court. And,
indeed, in at least one recent case applying a foreign state's law, the
parties had agreed to application of that law."'8

to judgments required reversal of trial court's denial of summary judgment to the
party who had prevailed in Michigan proceedings).
131 Of course, extracting principles from case results is not without its own
problems. Every first-year law student is taught that case facts and holdings can be
characterized in different ways to suit a client's position. One person's rule may be
another's exception.
132In preparation for this Article, I attempted to examine all choice of law cases
decided since 1990. My starting point was a LEXIS search with the following input:
"choice pre/3 law or conflict pre/3 laws and date > 1989." That search, initially
conducted in April 1993, generated about 300 cases, many of which involved choice
of law issues only tangentially or not at all. After reading all cases in which choice of
law was an issue, I supplemented the LEXIS search with recent cases cited in the cases
generated by the search.
133See Moore v. Ronald Hsu Constr. Co., 576 A.2d 734, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In
Moore, after both parties had relied on a Maryland statute, the trial court's decision
cited only a District of Columbia case. Quite naturally, on appeal, the winning party
"retreated somewhat from its position below, i.e., that the Maryland Act applies." Id.
at 737 n.2. Nevertheless, the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and held Maryland law
applicable. See id. at 738.

1994]

CHOICE OF LAW THEORY

3. Personal Injuries Resulting from Localized Activity
Many of the tort cases that generated the choice of law revolution of the 1960s and 1970s-Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,"' Babcock
Bernhard v. Harrah's
v. Jackson, 5' Reich v. Purcell,"'6
5
Club' T-arose out of airplane and automobile accidents. Multistate cases like these had grown far more common with the
increasing mobility of American society. Similarly, product liability
cases, in which parts and finished goods cause injuries far from the
state in which culpable conduct occurred, highlighted the imperfections in a choice of law system that focused exclusively on the
38
location of the victim's injury.1
Despite the re-evaluation of choice of law principles these cases
induced, recent case law demonstrates remarkable consistency in
tort cases involving localized activity. Where one party to a tort
action has engaged in activity localized in her home state, and her
home state's law protects her, the law of the state in which she has
acted will protect her, regardless of the forum in which the case
arises and the choice of law method the court purports to follow.139

13 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961) (rejecting application of Massachusetts
wrongful death limitation to case decided under Massachusetts negligence law).
135 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) (applying New York guest statute to case
involving automobile accident in Ontario).
1- 432 P.2d 727, 730-31 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (holding that Ohio wrongful death
statute should apply to Ohio residents killed in an automobile accident in Missouri
while en route to California).
1s 546 P.2d 719, 720-22 (Cal.) (holding that California law should govern action
against Nevada tavern owner by California resident injured in California by a third
party who purchased alcohol in Nevada), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
'ss See e.g., Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980) (involving a
wrongful death action against a Pennsylvania plane manufacturer and an Ohio
propeller manufacturer relating to a plane crash in Scotland), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235

(1981).
9
..
The results in these cases parallel the first two "Principles of Preference"
advanced by David Cavers, without relying on Cavers's principles. See DAVID CAVERS,
THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 139-46 (1965). Cavers's first principle provides:
Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard of
conduct or of financial protection against injury than do the laws of the
state where the person causing the injury has acted or had his home, the
laws of the state ofinjury should determine the standard and the protection
applicable to the case, at least where the person injured was not so related
to the person causing the injury that the question should be relegated to the
law governing their relationship.
Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted). His second principle provides:

978

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:949

Perhaps the clearest cases of localized activity are those in which
an out-of-state visitor seeks to hold a landowner liable for injuries
suffered on the landowner's land. In these cases, courts consistently
apply the law of the state in which the land is located if that law
would protect the landowner. For example, in O'Connor v. Busch
Gardens, a New Jersey court, purporting to apply interest analysis,
held that Virginia's contributory negligence rule would apply to a
claim by a New Jersey resident injured at a Virginia amusement
a New York court, following
park. 4 ' In Reale v. Herco, Inc.,'
the choice of law "rules" developed by the Court of Appeals in
Neumeier v. Kuehner,"2 applied Pennsylvania law to permit a
Pennsylvania camp to seek contribution on a negligent parental
supervision theory from the parents of an injured camper who had
sued the camp for negligence.14 ' And in Laport v. Lake Michigan
Management Co., 144 an Illinois court, applying its rule that the state
of injury governs unless Illinois has a more significant relationship
with the occurrence, held that Wisconsin law was properly applied
to determine a restaurant owner's liability for injuries suffered in
the bathroom of a Wisconsin Pizza Hut restaurant. 145 In each of

Where the liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted and caused
an injury set a lower standard of conduct or of financial protection than do
the laws of the home state of the person suffering the injury, the laws of the
state of conduct and injury should determine the standard of conduct or
protection applicable to the case, at least where the person injured was not
so related to the person causing the injury that the question should be
relegated to the law governing the relationship.
Id. at 146 (emphasis omitted).
Although Cavers distinguishes between localized activities and motor vehicle
accidents, courts tend to apply a version of Cavers's principles even to motor vehicle
accidents so long as the activity of one of the parties has been purely local. See e.g.,
De Rose v. NewJersey Transit Rail Operations, 565 N.Y.S.2d 305 (App. Div. 1991).
In De Rose, a child was killed by a NewJersey transit commuter train while crossing
the tracks near his New York home. See id. at 306. Although the commuter train
operated through both New York and NewJersey, the child's activity was purely local.
See id. In the action by his estate, the court refused to apply NewJersey's tort claims
act, which prescribed conditions precedent to any action against public entities and
barred recovery if the injured party's negligence exceeded 50%. See id.
140 See O'Connor, 605 A.2d at 775 (rejecting application of the New Jersey
comparative negligence statute).
141589 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 1992).
142 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972) (developing three rules upholding the
principle that the place of injury is the substantive law that should govern, unless the
host-driver and guest-passenger are domiciled in the same state).
143 See Reale, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
14 No. 1-90-3285, 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 2140 (App. Ct. Dec. 27, 1991).
145 See id. at *13-*15.
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these cases, the court protected the property owner by applying the
property was located, not the law of the
law of the state in which the
46
injured party's domicile.
The reasons courts have offered for focusing on the state in
which the land is located are not entirely persuasive. For instance,
although the O'Connorcourt wrote of Virginia's interest in deterring
negligent behavior, 4 it strains credulity to contend that an
amusement park tourist would investigate contributory negligence
rules before deciding how carelessly to behave. In Reale, the court
focused on the camp operator's reasonable expectations, 148 but it
is hardly likely that the camp operator had given a moment's
thought to its right to implead a child's parents if the child were
injured at camp. If the landowners' liability insurers could show
that they had set rates based on assumptions about state law,
perhaps they might be able to advance a plausible "expectations"
argument, especially since the risk in these cases, unlike in automobile cases, is localized in a particular state. Expectations arguments
advanced by insurance companies, however, rarely get a sympathetic
hearing.

49

Somehow, a widely shared sense of fairness appears to require
application of the law of the landowner's home state. Territorial
boundaries remain important in our federal system, and when a
landowner conducts localized activities in his home state, scholars
share the courts' reluctance to subject the landowner to the home
state law of a visitor injured on the land, at least when the landownEven interest analysts
er and visitor had no prior connection.'
" See Pascente v. Pascente, No. 91 Civ. 8104 (SS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1779,
at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,1993) (holding that Connecticut's contributory negligence
and collateral source rules are applicable to New York plaintiffs allegedly injured by
Connecticut defendants acting in Connecticut). The opinion does not detail the
nature of the alleged injuries or negligence.
14 The court stated: "Virginia's legitimate interest in discouraging unsafe local
property conditions and unsafe conduct is directly related to the substantive issue of
comparative-vs.-contributory negligence on which the conflicts question focuses."
O'Connor,605 A.2d at 775.
14s See Reale, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
149 Cf. WFiNTRAUB, supra note 33, at 287 (analyzing arguments about unfair
surprise to insurance companies and concluding that "to talk of 'surprising' the
insurer is very likely to be talking nonsense").
50 See, e.g., CAvERS, supra note 139, at 146 (explaining second principle of
preference where "liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted and caused
an injury set a lower standard of conduct or of financial protection than do the laws
of the home state of the injured party"); WEINTRAUB, supra note 33, at 342 (stating
that even if defendant is not unfairly surprised, "it is likely that the defendant will
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would concede that the law of the landowner's home state should
apply if suit were brought in that state. The instinct of most courts
and scholars to apply that law even when suit is brought elsewhere
no doubt reflects an aversion to forum-shopping by manipulative
plaintiffs.'
The tendency to apply the law of the state of injury in cases of
localized activity has not been limited to actions brought against
landowners. Cooney v. Osgood Machinery,152 recently decided by the
New York Court of Appeals, reflects a similar approach for cases
involving employment injuries: if an employee is injured at a fixed
work site in a state which immunizes the employer from liability, the
employer will not be subjected to liability under the law of some
53
other state.
In Cooney, the plaintiff employee was injured while cleaning a
machine at his regular place of employment in the defendant
employer's Missouri plant.'5 4 The employee received workers'
compensation benefits and then brought a products liability action
in New York against the machine's sales agent. 55 The sales agent
then served a third-party complaint against the employer, who
moved to dismiss based on Missouri's worker compensation statute,
which (unlike New York's statute) immunizes employers not only
from direct actions by injured workers, but also from contribution
claims by tort defendants.'
The Court of Appeals granted
summary judgment to the employer, characterizing the case as a
true conflict and holding that the law of the place of injury should

perceive his treatment as unfair if the plaintiff's state applies its law to him for no
other reason than that his victim is a resident of that state").
Recent cases appear willing to go further, applying the law of the place of injury
even when the injury arose in an on-the~job accident where the landowner had
substantial connection with the forum state. See Baedke v.John Morrell & Co., 748
F. Supp. 700,702 (N.D. Iowa 1990) (applying South Dakota law on loss of consortium
and contributory negligence to injury suffered by Iowa resident while working at the
South Dakota site of a multi-state corporation that operated plants in many states,
including Iowa); Salsman v. Barden & Robeson Corp., 564 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547-48 (App.
Div. 1990) (refusing to apply New York labor law statute to aid Pennsylvania resident
injured at Massachusetts construction site, despite fact that injured plaintiff was hired
by defendant-contractor in New York).
"' In O'Connor,for instance, the court noted that the plaintiff had first brought
suit in Virginia, and then dismissed the suit to proceed in NewJersey. See O'Connor,
605 A.2d at 774.
152 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1993).
153 See id. at 281.
15 See id. at 279.
155 See id.
5 See id.
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govern. 57 The court emphasized the local nature of employer's
activity, writing that the employer "could hardly have expected to be
haled before a New York court to respond in damages
for an
58
accident to a Missouri employee at the Missouri plant."1
Similarly, in other recent New York cases, both state and
federal, courts have indicated that a New York statute making
landowners and contractors strictly liable for injuries suffered at
construction sites should be applied for the benefit of injured
employees when, and only when, the accident occurs at a New York
worksite. Thus, in Salsman v. Barden & Robeson Corp.,' 59 the court
held that a Pennsylvania worker could not invoke the New York
statute against a New York general contractor for injuries suffered
at a Massachusetts construction site. And in Brewster v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co., 160 the court even denied the statute's protection
to a New York worker injured at a Pennsylvania job site. By
contrast, in Fiske v. Church of St. Mary of the Angels,' 6 ' involving a
New York construction site, the court permitted a contribution
action to proceed against a Pennsylvania subcontractor even though
the injured worker was an employee of that subcontractor and had
accepted workers' compensation benefits in Pennsylvania. If one
can generalize from these New York cases, 162 they suggest, taken
together, that the law of the state of injury will generally apply to
jobsite injuries arising at a stationary workplace. 6
'57 See id. at 283.
158 Id. at 284.
159 564

N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div. 1990).
1- 585 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (App. Div. 1992), affg 562 N.Y.S.2d 277 (App. Div.

1990).

161 802

F. Supp. 872 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).

16 2 But cf Brazones v. Prothe, 489 N.W.2d 900 (S.D. 1992), a recent South Dakota

case in which the court applied South Dakota law to deny recovery to South Dakota
residents injured in an employment related injury at an Iowa worksite. See id. at 903.
In Brazones, the injured workers were based in South Dakota while they served their
employer in more than one state. The court focused on the South Dakota
employment relationship in applying South Dakota's workers' compensation statute,
which permitted tort recovery only for intentional torts. See id. at 904-05.
Although in many respects the facts in the Brazones case resemble those in Fiske,
the Brazones court applied the law of the state in which the employment relation was
centered, not the state of injury.
16 In Fiske, for instance, the court took pains to distinguish earlier cases dealing
with work injuries suffered outside New York and cases in which the location of the
injury was "fortuitous" because it resulted from an airplane crash. See Fiske, 802 F.
Supp. at 879-80.
Even when an employment-related injury was suffered during an airplane crash,
at least one recent case has applied the law of the place of the injury. See Fitts v.
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4. Discouraging Blatant Forum Shopping
In most tort cases, including the cases discussed in the preceding Section, the tort plaintiff brings suit either at home or in a state
with which the defendant has a significant affiliation-generally, the
state of the defendant's domicile or incorporation, or the state in
which the defendant maintains its principal place of business.
When a plaintiff sues in some other forum, recent cases suggest that
the forum will depart from its own law if it suspects that a plaintiff
has chosen the forum only in the hope of securing application of a
more favorable law. For example, in New EnglandLeather Co v. Feuer
Leather Corp., M a Massachusetts partnership formed to sell leather
hides to the furniture industry contracted with a New York
corporation to supply leather to the partnership's customers. The
negotiations between the two took place in New York, orders were
transmitted to the supplier in New York, the hides were warehoused
in New York, and then shipped to customers in at least eleven
states. 165 Yet, when a dispute arose about the quality of the hides
shipped, the Massachusetts partnership brought suit, not in New
York or Massachusetts, but in North Carolina to take advantage of
a North Carolina unfair competition statute that provided for treble
damages and attorney's fees.' 66 The Fourth Circuit refused to
apply North Carolina law, emphasizing the potential for manipulation if the plaintiff were entitled to choose whatever law proved
most favorable. 167 Similarly, in Selle v. Pierce,1 68 one Nebraska
resident brought a defamation action against another Nebraska
resident in a South Dakota court, apparently intending to take
advantage of South Dakota's rule permitting punitive damages in
defamation actions. The court cited South Dakota's interest in

Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 820, 823 (Ala. 1991).
164 942 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1991).
165 See id. at 254, 256.
166 See id. at 254.
167 See id. at 256. Plaintiff,

the Massachusetts partnership, had argued that North
Carolina law should apply because its ability to do business in North Carolina was
harmed, and that North Carolina was therefore a place of injury. In rejecting this
argument, the court wrote: "NELC's [New England Leather Co.] proposed choice of
law rule is rife with opportunities for manipulation. For example, if NELC perceived
that it had a greater chance of recovery on its claims under Indiana law, it could
argue that Indiana law should apply because hides were shipped into that state." Id.
The court also rejected the partnership's argument that North Carolina law should
apply because North Carolina is the heart of the nation's furniture industry. See id.
1- 494 N.W.2d 634 (S.D. 1993).
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discouraging forum shopping as a basis for concluding that
69
Nebraska law should be applied.
5. The Absence of Conflicts Injustice: Substance Becomes All
As the last two Sections have demonstrated, there are cases,
even tort cases, in which courts have a strong sense of conflicts
justice: they believe that because of the location of certain actors
or events, particular rules should apply regardless of the substantive
merits of those rules. It would be a mistake, however, to believe
that courts have a strong sense of conflicts justice about all cases.
Particularly in cases involving automobile and airplane accidents, as
well as products liability litigation, courts might reasonably apply
more than one state's law without working any unfairness to the
parties. The parties have developed no expectations about the rules
that would apply to their actions, and the inherently multistate
nature of the activity makes it difficult to argue that the expectations of insurance companies, or insurance rates, will be affected by
a choice of law decision in a particular case."' ° Frequently in
these cases, courts do what Currie suggested they should do: apply
forum law. In those cases where they depart from forum law, the
evidence suggests that they do so more because they approve the
substantive result that foreign law will produce rather than out of
71
a sense of conflicts justice.'
169

See id. at 637. The defamation plaintiff in the case had alleged that allegations
made by defendant, sent to a third party in South Dakota, had impaired his business
reputation in South Dakota. The court wrote:
Though Selle may desire to punish monetarily, there is no indication that
South Dakota's law would be furthered by its use rather than the law of
Nebraska. South Dakota, as do all states, has an interest in discouraging
forum shopping. To allow Selle to use his business ties to this state as away
to punish Pierce, would be counterproductive to that end.
Id.
70
1 But cf Joseph Singer, A PragmaticGuide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REv. 731, 743
(1990) ("I refuse to accept the idea that expectations arguments are necessarily weak
in the torts context."). In this article, Singer catalogues expectations arguments
available in a variety of cases, but these expectations often carry little weight. See, e.g.,
id. at 781-83 (cataloguing expectations arguments for each side in particular cases, but
not using those arguments to resolve the cases).
"I See Singer, supra note 6, at 59. Singer writes:
In practice, it is quite dear that what courts ordinarily do in conflicts cases
is to apply forum law. Whatever the scholars say about it, the judges seem
to understand that the point of law is to do justice, and, to the extent they
view themselves as the moral voice of their community, they are likely to
understand forum interests as outweighing nonforum interests.
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1 72
Consider Hanley v. Forester.
An intoxicated Mississippi
resident drove his Corvette into oncoming traffic on a Florida
highway, killing himself and four other people, and seriously
injuring a Louisiana resident. 7
The driver's $70,000 insurance
policy was inadequate to satisfy all claims, and the driver's estate
was virtually insolvent.' 74 The injured Louisiana resident brought
an action in Mississippi federal court against the driver's father, a
Mississippi resident listed as a co-owner on the Corvette's certificate
of title. 175 Under Florida law, a co-owner of a vehicle may be
liable for the driver's negligence if the car is driven with the coowner's consent; by contrast, under Mississippi law, an owner is
liable only if the owner is negligent in entrusting the car to the
driver. 76 The Fifth Circuit's choice, therefore, was this: hold
Florida law applicable and permit the injured victim's claim against
the driver's father (and presumably his insurance company) to
stand, or hold Mississippi law applicable and deny relief to the
victim. 177 Not surprisingly, the appellate court held Florida law

applicable.

178

One might, of course, argue that the result was simply wise
application of ordinary choice of law principles, having nothing to
do with the substantive result in the case. After all, the accident did

Id.; see also Kramer, supra note 122, at 466 ("[I]n deciding choice of law casesjudges
really do seem driven by their desire to apply a preferred substantive law without
regard for independent choice of law considerations.").
172 903 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1990).
173 See id. at 1031.
'" See id. at 1031 nn.1-2.
175 The father had also cosigned the note financing the car. See id. at 1031.
176 See id. at 1031-32.
1
7 The trial court had granted the father's summary judgment motion, holding
that the victim had not made a prima fade showing that the father had been
negligent in entrusting the car to his son. See id. at 1031.
17 See id. at 1034. Of course, if a state supreme court prefers the substantive law
of another state, there is no need to use choice of law principles to apply that law;
instead, the court could simply change forum law to reflect its preferences. That
option is not, however, available to state trial or intermediate appellate courts, nor
is it available to federal courts. Moreover, even a state supreme court may prefer to
act incrementally rather than deciding that a pre-existing rule should be abandoned
for all future cases. See, e.g., I.J. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v.Jackson, 708 P.2d 682, 685,
691 (Cal. 1985) (abandoning an 1872 statute because the doctrine for which the
statute stands was "obsolete, archaic and outmoded"); Offshore Rental Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 728 (Cal. 1978) (declining to apply California law
over Louisiana law because "California's interest in the application of its unusual and
outmoded statute is comparatively less strong than Louisiana's corollary interest, so
lately expressed in its prevalent and progressive law").
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occur in Florida, and the Mississippi Supreme Court had said that
the law of the place of injury should govern in tort cases unless
some other state has a more significant relationship with the
issue."7 9 But neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in Hanley was
a Florida resident, and in an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit, applying
Mississippi choice of law rules, had refused to apply the place of
injury rule to an airplane accident case when the state of injury had
no relationship to the crash other than the circumstance that the
plane crashed there."' 0 Moreover, the deterrence argument advanced by the Hanley court rings hollow;' 8 ' denying recovery to this
victim would be unlikely to have any effect on the safety of Florida
highways. The inference is strong, then, that the court was
motivated at least in substantial measure by the desire to afford
recovery to the victim, and application of Florida law was the easiest
route to take.
Tort plaintiffs do not invariably benefit from the tendency of
courts to examine substantive results in the process of deciding
choice of law cases. Often, the substantive result the court favors
may be one that benefits the defendant. In particular, where forum
law would permit a plaintiff to recover damages without demonstrating any pecuniary loss, or to recover punitive damages, a number of
courts have gone out of their way to apply the law of another state
to limit the plaintiffs damages.
Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.' 2 illustrates the
antipathy to super-compensatory damages. An entire Alabama
family-husband, wife, and their three children-was killed when the
private plane piloted by the husband crashed after takeoff in Florida
on the family's return from a vacation.'
The wife's father, on
behalf of the wife and children, brought an Alabama wrongful death
action against the designer and manufacturer of the plane and the
designer and manufacturer of a flight instrument. 184 He sought
application of Alabama law, because under Florida law funeral
expenses would have been the only compensatory damages available
79

See Hanley, 903 F.2d at 1032 (citing Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509,516 (Miss.

1968)).
o See Chain v. Thompson, 818 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 1987).
1 The court wrote: "The State of Florida has a manifest interest in preserving
the integrity and safety of its highway system and preventing the type of injuries
which resulted from this tragic accident." Hanley, 903 F.2d at 1033.
18 581 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1991).
183
1 See id. at 819.
8 See id.
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on behalf of the wife and children, who were not earning income at
the time of their death.185 The Alabama Supreme Court held
Florida law applicable, declining to abandon its lex loci rule "on the
facts of the present case."18 6 That very formulation indicated an
openness to changing the established choice of law rule in other
cases, but offered little support for the damage claim of this
plaintiff who had suffered no pecuniary loss.
Lee v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.18 illustrates how antipathy toward
punitive damages might color choice of law analysis. A Florida
resident, employed by Delta Air Lines as a flight attendant, died in
a plane crash at the Dallas/Fort Worth airport. 88 Her husband
filed for workers' compensation benefits in Florida, but the claim
was denied, except for funeral benefits, because the husband was
not a dependent of the deceased employee. 8 The husband then
brought a tort action in Texas, seeking actual and exemplary
damages. 9 8 In granting summary judgment to Delta, the court
noted that in Texas, as in Florida, workers' compensation would
generally provide the exclusive remedy for a deceased employee; the
only significant difference between Texas law and Florida law was
that in Texas, the survivors of a deceased employee were entitled to
exemplary damages if death was caused by the employer's willful
acts or gross negligence.'9 1 On this issue, the court, purporting
to apply the Second Restatement, held that Florida law applied, and
denied relief to the employee's husband. 9
In Lee, a Texas federal court applied Florida law to deny
recovery to a Florida resident for death occurring outside Florida;
by contrast, in Fitts, an Alabama court applied Florida law to deny
recovery to a non-Florida resident killed in Florida. What unites the
cases is the substantive law result: in each case, plaintiffs who had
suffered no pecuniary loss as a result of the allegedly wrongful
death were denied the opportunity to persuade a jury to make a
substantial award. 9
15 See id. at 820 n.1.
18
Id. at 823.
18"797 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
188
See id. at 1364.
189See id.
190 See id.

at 1363.

191 See
'9

id. at 1369.
See id. at 1372-74.

11 Cf Selle v. Pierce, 494 N.W.2d 634, 637-38 (S.D. 1993) (applying Nebraska law
to bar plaintiff's punitive damage claim in defamation action).
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It is not possible to prove rigorously that courts focus on
substantive results in deciding many choice of law cases. The
language courts use in their opinions always draws on choice of law
cases and principles, and most opinions offer a respectable choice
of law rationalization for the result the court has reached. But just
as vested rights doctrine afforded courts enough escape hatches to
permit them to reach almost any result in any case,19 4 modern
choice of law theory provides ample authority to permit a court to
reach virtually any result in any litigated case."' What opinions
do not generally reveal is how courts choose from among the
panoply of choice of law principles. The cases discussed in this
Section-and others'9 --suggest that achieving the substantive result
19 For example, leading conflicts casebooks provide examples ofjudicial use of
escape devices to avoid results seemingly dictated by the First Restatement. See LEA
BRILMAYER &JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 120-82 (3d ed. 1990); ROGER C.
CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 39-83 (5th ed. 1993); WILLIS REESE ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 462-78 (9th ed. 1990).
195 See Kramer, supra note 122, at 466 ("[I]n deciding choice of law cases, judges
really do seem driven by their desire to apply a preferred substantive law without
regard for independent choice of law considerations.").
" See, e.g., Allison v. ITE Imperial Corp., 928 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1991), in which
South Central Bell contracted with a Mississippi corporation to inspect, dean, and test
switch equipment located in Tennessee. During the process, a Mississippi employee
was injured when a part fell off a circuit breaker he was trying to remove, causing an
electrical fire and explosion. See id. at 138. When the employee and the Mississippi
corporation brought a products liability action against the Pennsylvania manufacturer
of the breaker, the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, held the claim time-barred
by Tennessee's 10-year statute of limitations on products liability actions. See id. at
145.
From the perspective of interest analysis, the court's conclusion is ludicrous. If
the law of the forum, the plaintiff's home state, would give the plaintiff a recovery,
and if the defendant's home state (Pennsylvania) would not protect the defendant
from liability (the court never indicated what statute of limitations was applicable in
Mississippi or Pennsylvania), then there would be little reason to bar the claim based
on a Tennessee statute. Moreover, so long as the defendant manufactures the
breakers in Pennsylvania, and that state would not bar the claim, the defendant
cannot have any claim that its expectations would be frustrated by allowing the claim
to proceed. Presumably, other breakers sold in other states, including Pennsylvania,
could have exhibited the same supposed defects.
Moreover, statutes of limitations were historically treated as "procedural," and

hence to be governed by forum law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 142 cmt. e (Proposed Revisions 1986) (indicating that even at the time of the

First Restatement, courts usually characterized statutes of limitation as procedural).
Indeed, the court's emphasis on Tennessee's stronginterest in "insuring that products
liability actions are brought within a reasonable time frame while evidence is still
available," Allison, 928 F.2d at 144, is curious because it would appear to reinforce the
procedural nature of the statute: one of Tennessee's concerns is that its courts not
be burdened with cases marred by stale evidence.
The Allison court, then, went out of its way to bar this claim, despite the fact that
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favored by the judge plays an important role in that choice.
6. Case Management Concerns
When choice of law questions reach appellate courts, fact
disputes are rarely significant. If the appeal is of ajudgment on the
pleadings or of a summary judgment determination, the appellate
court may generally assume a set of facts in considering whether the
lower court's choice of law decision was legally "correct"; if the
appeal comes after trial, the appellate court may well be bound by
the findings of fact below. It should not be surprising, then, that
many leading conflicts theorists, who have focused largely on
appellate cases, have underemphasized the role of choice of law
197
determinations in the case management process.
Typically, however, trial courts make initial choice of law
determinations, and case management concerns frequently
predominate. Thus, in cases involving many parties and common
issues, applying different rules of law to each plaintiff or defendant
would create an administrative nightmare that courts would endure
only for reasons more compelling than those usually advanced in
198
choice of law cases.

both traditional and modern choice of law theory could easily have permitted the
claim to proceed. One's strong surmise is that the court agreed with the premises
behind the Tennessee limitation statute, and sought to apply the statute broadly.
'" Neither in the First Restatement nor in his three-volume treatise, see BIALE,
supra note 18, did Beale discuss at what stage in its proceedings a trial court should
make a choice of law determination. Currie's discussions of interest analysis assumed
an established set of facts; he did not explicitly consider the impact interest analysis
might have on the fact-finding process. See e.g., Currie, Married,supranote 24, at 228
(considering the facts of Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), as established, for
purposes of further analysis). The Second Restatement, too, largely ignores questions
of case management.
The American Law Institute has not ignored these questions altogether. The
ALI's Complex Litigation Project does deal with these issues. See Complex Litigation
Project-ProposedFinalDraft, 1993 A.L.I. 386-93. Interestingly, however, that project
has not been directed by conflicts scholars.
198Judge Weinstein's opinion in In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y.
1992), explores the reasons for applying a single rule of law in mass tort cases.
Plaintiffs, who had been exposed to diethylstilbestrol ("DES") in utero, sought
damages against manufacturers and distributors of the drug, which had been used in
the 1 9 50s and 1960s to prevent miscarriage but was later linked to a variety of
disorders, some serious. See id. at 558-59. Defendant manufacturers sought
application of the law of the manufacturers' home states in order to avoid NewYork's
enterprise liability rule, which would hold a manufacturer liable even if the
manufacturer could demonstrate that it had not marketed the drug in New York and
could not therefore have been the cause of a New York plaintiff's injuries. See id. at
563-64 (citing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493
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Even in cases involving fewer parties, the timing of choice of law
determinations can shape much of the litigation. If a court makes
a choice of law determination early in the litigation process, it may
foreclose litigation about facts that would be relevant only if a
particular state's law were applied to the issue at hand. Indeed, in
some cases, an early choice of law determination might permit
resolution of the entire case on the pleadings or on summary
judgment motion.
Baedke v. John Morrell & Co.' 99 illustrates the desire of parties
and courts to limit the scope of litigation by resolving choice of law
questions early. In Baedke, an Iowa resident died after he ingested
toxic gases when his breathing apparatus failed while he was
cleaning out sewage lines at a South Dakota meat packing plant. 00
In an action for damages against the plant operator, the plant
operator sought partial summary judgment on whether South
Dakota or Iowa law should apply to three issues: the availability of
damages for loss of consortium, the effect of contributory negligence on plaintiff's claim, and the applicability of the two states'
wrongful death acts."' All parties agreed that the summary
judgment motion was an appropriate vehicle for resolving the
issues, 20 2 and the court determined that South Dakota law applied
203
to the first two issues.
Consider the parties' motivations on the contributory negligence
issue: if contributory negligence were an absolute bar to recovery,
defendant would have an incentive to pour resources into investigating decedent's behavior and into proving contributory negligence,
no matter how insignificant a contributing factor decedent's
behavior might have been. By contrast, if a comparative negligence
rule applied, defendant might not find it worthwhile to prove that
U.S. 944 (1989)). Judge Weinstein held NewYork law applicable to all claims brought
by New York plaintiffs: "A finding that the law of each defendant's state applies
would not merely cripple the New York courts in their attempt to process DES
litigation efficiently; it would undermine the very policy that Hymowitz and subsequent
cases have developed." Id. at 568. Even if the substantive policy concerns cited by
Judge Weinstein were peculiar to the DES cases, the judicial economy rationale for
applying the same law to related cases is of much broader application.
19 748 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Iowa 1990).
200 See id. at 701.
201See id. at 701-02.
22 See id. at 702.

'0' See id. at 705-08. The parties had not explained to the court what differences
there were between the two wrongful death statutes. Hence, the court declined to
resolve that question. See id. at 708.
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decedent's negligence had contributed to the accident unless the
decedent's conduct was a substantial contributing factor. If the
court had refused to make a choice of law determination until all
the facts were developed at trial, both parties might have been
compelled to expend resources litigating an issue that might
20 4
otherwise have proven irrelevant to the result in the case.
In cases like Baedke, an early choice of law determination
serves to focus further litigation. In other cases, like Hanley v.
Forester,2 ' an early choice of law decision can put an effective end
to the litigation-at least if the court decides the choice of law
question in a particular way. In Hanley, a drunk driver's victim
brought an action against the driver's father, who shared title to the
car. 2 6 Under the law of Florida, where the accident occurred, a
car's owner is liable for the negligence of the driver; under the law
of Mississippi, where the driver and his father lived, the owner is
liable only if he negligently entrusted the car to the driver. 20 7 The

Fifth Circuit, clearly sympathetic to the victim, had three choices:
(1) hold Florida law applicable, (2) hold Mississippi law applicable,
or (3) refuse to make a decision until after trial. By deciding that
Florida law was applicable, the court set the stage for a quick
recovery by the injured victim. 20 ' Either of the other alternatives
might have involved a protracted trial over the father's negli20 9
gence.
204 Sometimes the parties, by structuring their pleadings, can compel an early

choice of law determination. Grudoffv. American Airlines, No. 90-C-7462, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14583 (N.D. 111. Oct. 7, 1991), is illustrative. The plaintiff, seeking
damages from an employer who had fired him, pleaded three identical counts for
breach of contract and three identical counts for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, one under the law of each of three states. See id. at *3-*4. Plaintiff also
pleaded two other identical counts for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
two separate counts under a particular state's statutes. See id. at *4. When the
employer moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court had to determine whether,
on the facts pleaded, each count stated a claim as a matter of law. As a result, the
court dismissed nine of plaintiff's ten counts. See id. at *10.
205 903 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of Hanley, see supra notes 17281 and accompanying text.
206 See id. at 1031.
207
See id. at 1031-32.
" The court did indicate that the court below would have to consider whether
Florida law would permit recovery against a co-owner, and whether Florida would
adhere to existing case law. See id. at 1034. Nevertheless, the court's decision
certainly enhanced the victim's chance of obtaining a quick settlement.
2
Although the trial court had concluded that the victim had failed to make a
prima fade showing of negligent entrustment, and had therefore granted summary
judgment to the owner-father, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[t]here was conflicting
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In still other cases, an early choice of law determination may be
designed to stimulate settlement by reducing the uncertainty
surrounding the course of the litigation. Consider Mascarella v.
Brown,21 ° in which a New Jersey employee of E.R. Squibb brought
an action against an independent New York radiologist to whom
Squibb had sent her mammogram fies for reading. When she
brought an action against the radiologist for negligence in failing to
diagnose cancer, the radiologist filed a third-party complaint against
Squibb. 211 The court denied Squibb's summary judgment motion,
which had been based on New Jersey worker compensation laws
precluding third-party contribution claims against the employer of
an injured employee. 212 Rather than simply denying the motion
on the ground that facts presented might make New York law
applicable, and therefore permit contribution, the court wrote an
opinion essentially holding New York law applicable. 213 As a
result, the court reduced the uncertainty the parties would have
faced had the court left the choice of law question open. This
reduction in uncertainty might have increased the chance of
settlement.
On the other hand, by delaying a choice of law determination,
a trial court might avoid ever deciding a potentially knotty choice
of law issue. The facts might unfold in a way that would produce
liability, or preclude liability, under the law of each of the competing states. 2 1' Even if the court ultimately has to make a choice of
law decision, it may be able to do so with more information about
factors potentially relevant to the decision: party expectations, state
policies, or even the location of particular events. Finally, deferring
a choice of law determination, like accelerating the decision, has the
evidence as to whether Forester had reason to know or suspect that Tommy had a
propensity to operate a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants." Id. at 1031
n.3. The footnote suggests that, were it not for the court's conclusion that the father
would be liable under Florida law even in the absence of negligent entrustment, the
court would have reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the
negligent entrustment issue.
2 0 813 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
211 See id. at 1017.
212 See id. at 1017-20.
213

See id.

See Coar v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 92-357, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19713, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1992) (deferring choice of law decision until the cause
of the accident, and the location of the conduct causing the accident, had been
determined at trial). By declining to make the choice of law determination, the court
might have set the stage for settlement or for a resolution of fact questions at trial
that would have made a choice of law decision unnecessary.
214

992

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:949

potential to influence settlement negotiations between the parties.
Since either decision affects the potential duration of the litigation,
not to mention the ultimate outcome, one party or the other may

be more eager to settle depending on the course of action the court
takes.
Choice of law theorists have generally ignored these case
management concerns, concentrating instead on how to advance

state interests, protect party expectations, or enforce choice of law
"rights." To judges, by contrast, case management concerns are

often paramount. As we have seen, both the substance and the
timing of choice of law decisions can have a significant impact on
case management; when and how choice of law decisions are made
may determine the duration and direction of litigation. So long as
choice of law theory focuses only on what state's law should be
applied to particular facts, theory cannot possibly capture the
considerations that inform judicial choice of law decisions.
III. THE DISMAL FuTuRE OF CHOICE OF LAW THEORY

I have argued that the liberal citation of choice of law theory in
recently decided cases overstates the significance of choice of law
principles. Those principles determine case results only when
courts have an intuitive sense thatjustice requires application of the
law of a particular state. Most choice of law cases, however, do not
generate that intuitive sense of conflicts justice. In the ordinary
choice of law case, choice of law principles take a back seat to the
substantive results that are generated by the competing rules and
the effect competing rules might have on litigation complexity and
settlement negotiations. Does this "failure" of choice of law theory
stem from inadequacy in the approaches developed so far, or is the
problem inherent to choice of law theory? In other words, are all
comprehensive choice of law theories doomed to failure?
My argument is that most of the premises and principles that
underlie any given choice of law theory are sufficiently unimportant
to courts that any attempt to implement a comprehensive theory is
doomed. In this respect, choice of law policies and principles differ
from those that underlie our systems of civil, criminal, and
administrative procedure. Considerations of substance often color
decisions on procedural issues, just as substance informs choice of
law decisions. But courts recognize that procedural requirements
perform an essential function in any legal system; without a core of
procedural rules, adjudication and administration is impossible.
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Hence, substance is not all; courts and administrators recognize that
substantive results must be balanced against the harm to the system
that would result if procedures were entirely ignored. By contrast,
the state policies that serve as the focus of consequentialist choice
of law theories rarely rise to the significance necessary to induce a
judge to abandon a substantive result she might prefer; the choice
of law "rights" emphasized by rights theorists are not so fundamento
tal that they command allegiance when they seem inconvenient
215
a judge seeking to do justice between the competing parties.
A. Choice of Law and the Common-Law Process
Many choice of law theorists share the view that courts resolve,
or should resolve, choice of law questions before applying the
applicable law to determine liability on the facts of the case. The
jurisdiction-selecting rules of the First Restatement, authored by
Beale, certainly operated on the premise that the choice of law
determination is a separate and temporally earlier step in the
process of deciding a case. 216 Contemporary rights theorists
accept the same premise. Douglas Laycock, for instance, has argued
for choice of law rules that would be "applied to all cases within
[their] scope, without regard to which state is the forum and
without regard to who is helped or hurt."217 Perry Dane's plea for
215

Cf Singer, supra note 6, at 6 (arguing that multistate cases should "ordinarily

be resolved by application of what the forum considers to be the better law").

216For instance, the First Restatement described how a court should determine
the place of contracting in order to determine, under § 311, which state's law should
govern questions concerning the formation of a contract:

Under its Conflict of Laws rules, in determining the place of contracting,
the forum ascertains the place in which, under the general law of Contracts,

the principal event necessary to make a contract occurs. The forum at this
stage of the investigation does not seek to ascertain whether there is a
contract. It examines the facts of the transaction in question only so far as
is necessary to determine the place of the principal event, if any, which,
under the general law of Contracts, would result in a contract. Then, and
not until then, does the forum refer to the law of such state to ascertainif, under
that law, there is a contract ....

§ 311 cmt. d (1934) (emphasis added).
Laycock, supra note 3, at 324. Laycock argues that state interests should be

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS
217

considered in formulating choice of law rules, but not in what he regards as the

analytically separate step of applying those rules:
I would consider each state's interest in regulating potential disputes. But
I would consider state interests only as a step to selecting a particular

person, thing, relationship, act, or event that will be controlling in locating
the dispute within a territory. The goal is to specify a choice-of-law rule that
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"vestedness" in choice of law determinations 218 assumes that in
choice of law cases, "a court's role is to discover and enforce
whatever normative structure-that is, set of legal rights-applies in
219
the case at hand."
The assumption that a choice of law determination is analytically
separate from other aspects of a case is not limited to rights
theorists.
Currie himself-the leading consequentialist among
choice of law scholars-assumed that courts would start by investigating the laws of the competing states and the policies that underlie
those laws in order to determine which states had an interest in
application of their own policies. 220 Even Larry Kramer, who
seeks to debunk the notion that the choice of law process is
significantly different from the process of determining which
domestic rules are applicable and who argues that "'choosing' and
'applying' are not analytically distinct processes," 221 nevertheless
suggests that a court's first task in deciding a choice of law case is
"to determine whether each law applies to the particular dispute."2 22 Kramer's proposed analysis-like those of rights theorists
and most interest analysts-is heavily law-centered; he suggests that
the first step in his analysis could produce any of three results-"no
law may confer a right, only one law may confer a right, or several
22
laws may confer rights." 1
However widely shared this law-centered approach to the choice
of law process may be among conflicts scholars, 224 the approach
is at odds with our most persuasive descriptions of the judicial
decision-making process. Our best common-law judges do not
decide cases deductively, starting with major premises and then
applying those premises to the facts at hand. Instead, they start

will then be applied to all cases that fall within the rule, without regard to
any state's interest in a particular case.
Id. at 330.
218 See Dane, supra note 1, at 1242-72.
219
Id. at 1245.
9 See Currie, Notes, supra note 25, at 183-84.
22 Kramer, supra note 1, at 290-91.
Id. at 291; see also Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 253 (1991) ("[T]he court should begin by
examining the laws in issue to determine whether both may potentially apply-i.e., to
determine whether there is a conflict.").
22 Kramer, supra note 1, at 304.
224Joseph Singer is a notable dissenter. Singer argues that the court's initial focus
in choice of law cases should be "on the basic considerations of substantive justice
and social policy that underlie the area of law at issue .... " Singer, supra note 6, at
79.
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with the facts before them, form a tentative judgment about which
party deserves to win, and then use precedent and other sources of
authority as a background against which to check, or rethink, their
conclusions.
In an annual unpublished lecture to first-year students at
Cardozo Law School, the late Charles D. Breitel, formerly chief
judge of the New York Court of Appeals, used to explain thatjudges
first approached cases by asking themselves which party deserved to
win. Only after ascertaining where justice lies in the individual case
do judges move on the next question: What harm to the jurisprudence will result if I do justice in the individual case?
Judge Breitel's description of the judicial process is consistent
with those offered by other respected-and sometimes reveredjudges. Cardozo wrote that "[t]he common law does not work from
pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is inductive, and
it draws its generalizations from particulars." 225 Jerome Frank,
later a distinguished federal judge,226 wrote that:
talks with candid judges have begun to disclose that, whatever is
said in opinions, the judge often arrives at his decision before he
tries to explain it. With little or no preliminary attention to legal
rules or a definite statement of facts, he often makes up his mind
that Jones should win the lawsuit, not Smith .... 227
228
Others have echoed similar themes.

225 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 22-23 (1921).
Cardozo went on to quote Munroe Smith for the proposition that the common law
is essentially an experimental process:
The rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final truths,
but as working hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories
of the law, the courts ofjustice. Every new case is an experiment; and if the
accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be
unjust, the rule is reconsidered.
Id. at 23 (quoting MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909)).
226
Jerome Frank sat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
from 1941 to 1957.
'Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 653 (1932).
"8 Justice Brennan, for instance, has written that "[s]ensitivity to one's intuitive
and passionate responses, and awareness of the range of human experience, is
therefore not only an inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial process, an aspect
more to be nurtured than feared." WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Reason, Passion,and "The
Progress of Law," 10 CARDOzO L. REv. 3, 10 (1988). Justice Brennan went on to
describe how a modern judge might approach the problem faced by the Supreme
Court in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Noting that the approach in
Lochner flowed from a premise of "negative liberty," while a different result might
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The structure of the trial and appellate processes supports the
notion that courts consider facts first and law second in reaching
their decisions. Lawyers invariably start their briefs with a statement of facts, not an analysis of law. Discussion of legal issues
appears only after the advocate has conditioned the judge to a view
trial and
of the facts most favorable to her client. Works on
229
facts.
of
importance
the
emphasize
appellate advocacy

occur if a court started with a premise of positive libertyJustice Brennan went on to
write:
But how do we arrive at a new concept such as positive liberty? Although
we might get here by a process of abstract philosophical reflection, most of
us would initially take a different route. The concept of positive liberty is
easily arrived at by considering the plight of an employee whose only
"choice" is between working the hours the employer demands or not
working at all. Such a choice strikes us, intuitively, as no choice at all.
Upon reasoned reflection, we are able to give rational expression to this
intuitive response by means of the concept of positive liberty.
Id. at 11. In other words, the process starts with intuition-imagination-and the
intuitive result is then subjected to reason as a check. Thus, Justice Brennan notes
that a particularly brutal crime may generate a "visceral temptation to help prosecute
the criminal," a temptation the judge must resist in order "to preserve the values and
guarantees of our system of criminal justice." Id.; see also Jack G. Day, How Judges
Think: Verification of theJudicialHunch, 1 J. CONTEMP. LEG. IssUES 73, 82-101 (1988)
(suggesting that gestalt theory provides a helpful explanation of the judicial decisionmaking process).
'Judge Albert Tate has written:
The statement of the facts is regarded by many advocates and judges as the
most important part of the brief ... . [L]aw and legal principles are

designed to produce fair and socially useful result when applied to facts.
This fundamental aim of law lurks in the mind of the judge. If the
application of the given legal principle produces a result deemed unfair by
thejudge, he will wish to study carefully whether indeed the given principle
was truly intended to apply to the particular facts before him.
Albert Tate, Jr., The Art of Brief-Writing What a Judge Wants to Read, in PETER J.
CARRE ET AL., APPELLATE ADVOCACY 103, 106 (1982); see also ROBERTJ. MARTINEAU,
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN APPELLATE ADVOCACY 153 (1985) ("Perhaps the greatest
weakness in most appellate briefs is the writer's failure to use the facts of his case in
the argument section to demonstrate the basicjustice of his client's cause."); Malcolm
L. Edwards, Briefs on the Merits, in CARRE ET AL., supra, at 131, 135-36 (emphasizing
importance of statement of facts in brief writing).
John W. Davis, perhaps the leading appellate advocate of his generation, wrote:
[I]t cannot be too often emphasized that in an appellate court the statement
of the facts is not merely a part of the argument, it is more often than not
the argument itself. A case well stated is a case far more than half argued
....
The court wants above all things to learn what are the facts which give
rise to the call upon its energies; for in many, probably in most, cases when
the facts are clear there is no great trouble about the law. Lxfacto oriturjus,
and no court ever forgets it.
John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 897 (1940).
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None of this suggests that legal rules or doctrines are irrelevant
in the decision-making process. EvenJerome Frank recognized that
the process of determining facts is intertwined with determining
what rules should apply to those facts."'0 As Karl Llewellyn put it,
"judges are law-conditioned."2"'
In Charles Yablon's words, "the
existence and apprehension by the judge of various doctrinal
materials might well be one of the background conditions of the
ruling."232
Even beyond the background impact legal norms might have in
developing ajudge's sense of the case, legal rules and doctrines act
as a constraint on judicial decisions. Judges typically use rules and

precedent to check their inclinations. Frank wrote:
The conscientiousjudge, having tentatively arrived at a conclusion,
can check up to see whether such a conclusion, without unfair
distortion of the facts, can be linked with the generalized points
of view theretofore acceptable. If none such are discoverable, he
is forced to consider more acutely whether his tentative conclusion
is wise, both with respect to the case before him and with respect
23
to possible implications for future cases. 3

But legal rules-especially those developed through the common-law
process-are rarely so precise that they preclude interpretation to
reach the judge's preferred result. 23 4 In those cases where an
established legal rule is incompatible with the decision the judge
235
believes best, how the judge will decide is uncertain.
230

See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 134-35 (1935) (stating that
judges select facts which will make their decision logical).
231

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS

201

(1960). Llewellyn also wrote of Roman judges "that they got controlled by Law at a
deeper level, with greater effectiveness, and with finer results than ever has been
achieved by mere conscious Rules of Law." Id. at 203.
2"2 Charles M. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: CriticalLegal Studies and the
Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 917, 924 (1985).
2 FRANK, supra note 230, at 131. In a footnote, Frank quoted Balfour on formal
logic: "[i]t never aids the work of thought, it only acts as its auditor and accountantgeneral." Id. at 131.
1 In Llewellyn's words:
Tihe form of words in which a rule is normally cast is very likely, thanks to
the looseness of language, to be subject to a range of readings which not
only rove in scope from the perverse literalistic all the way to the
semifigurative, but also swing through various compass points according to
diverse definitions or flavors of the constituent terms.... In our law, the
rule rephrases of itself, almost, to adjust a notch or three, a compass point
or four, to the call of sense ....
LLEWELLYN, supra note 231, at 180-81.
" Llewellyn, drawing upon Fuller's figure, wrote:
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Larry Kramer has argued that choice of law cases are not
fundamentally different from domestic cases. 216 If he is right, one
would expect judges to approach choice of law cases as they do
domestic cases: by using judgment, derived from background values,
experience, training, and a myriad of other factors, to develop a
sense of who should win. 21 7 Choice of law cases are not, however,
cases in which choice of law is the only issue; choice of law cases are
primarily tort cases, contract cases, or estates cases. 28 When the
judge develops a sense of who should win, the substantive aspects
of the case are likely to predominate-unless ignoring choice of law
issues would offend the judge's sense of justice by, for instance,
frustrating expectations on which a party relied or promoting
forum-shopping. 2 9 To persuade the judge to alter her initial
conclusions because those conclusions violate choice of law
principles, a choice of law scholar (or a practicing litigator) would
have to demonstrate that application of the choice of law principle

If you pen an animal in an enclosure too close for comfort, you can be sure
it will try hard to get out, but to predict whether it will succeed (much
more: how it will, if it does) calls for knowledge of more factors than just
the "desire" and the "corral."
Id. at 180.
s See Kramer, supra note 1, at 290. Kramer argues:
The only difference is that some of the facts are connected to different
states, and the court must determine if that affects whether the law or laws
at issue confer a right. While this determination may be difficult, it does
not alter the nature of the problem confronting the court, which remains
to decide what rights are conferred by positive law.

Id.

2 7 See Paul A. Freund, ChiefJusticeStone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv.

1210, 1215-16 (1946) (arguing that choice of better law in choice of law cases is not
significantly different from choices judges make in purely domestic cases); see also
Singer, supra note 170, at 733 (1990) ("[Ilt often seems-quite correctly-that
decisionmakers have initial intuitions about the correct result and simply manipulate
the factors to justify reaching that result.").
" See Singer, supra note 6, at 79 (stating that conflicts "cases present ordinary
issues or tort, contract, property, family, and corporate law"); Weintraub, supra note
7, at 156 (stating that "[t]he heart of the problem of mass tort litigation lies not in the
conflicts problems, but in our law of torts, in the distribution of legal services, and
in the civil jury trial").
9
..
See Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of
Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 681 (1987) (contending that most
important constitutional values at issue in choice of law are "those related to fairness
to the litigants"); Singer, supra note 6, at 79-80 (concluding that decision-makers
should consider unique aspects of choice of law cases, such as state interest and party
reliance on other state law, when making their substantive analysis of the case to
determine which law to apply).
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is necessary either to promote some more broadly defined social
policy or to vindicate some fundamental right, and that the policy
or right is sufficiently important to justify sacrificing the judge's
initial conception of justice in the case at hand. In the next two
Sections, I shall argue that this burden is a nearly impossible one for
the choice of law scholar to carry.
B. Developing a Choice of Law Theory to Achieve
State Policy Objectives
For consequentialist theorists, the objective of choice of law
theory is, in the words of Lea Brilmayer, "to maximize all of the
objectives that states have chosen for themselves-whatever they
might be." 4 ' For modem consequentialists, as we have seen,
Currie's brand of interest analysis is deficient because it focuses
only on maximizing the forum state's domestic policies and ignores
multistate policies shared by many states.2 4' The consequentialist
objection to an approach that seeks only to do "justice" for the
parties in the individual case would be similar: courts should not
forfeit the opportunity to develop a broader framework that would
more consistently advance state policies.
Thus, Larry Kramer emphasizes "the need for states to compromise with one another in order to maximize the extent to which
they can successfully implement their domestic and multistate
policies." 24 2 Lea Brilmayer writes that "[s]tates have much to gain
243
if they can find a way to pursue their interests cooperatively."
Both Kramer and Brilmayer suggest that game theory provides a
framework for increased cooperation in choice of law cases.
Kramer develops what he calls illustrative "canons of construction" 244 for true conflict cases, and uses game theory to argue that
it will be in the long-term interest of all states to adopt the canons
245
rather than pursuing self-interest in choice of law cases.
Brilmayer makes no effort to advance particular choice of law rules
2

40

BRLMAYER,

supra note 1, at 150.

supra part I.B.
242 Kramer, supra note 1, at 315; see also Kramer, supra note 222, at 275 ("What
we need, then, is a set of interpretive rules designed to maximize state interests.").
243 BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 155.
24 Kramer, supra note 1, at 319-38.
245 See id. at 342-43.
241 See
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or "canons," but argues that institutions could be developed to
246
ensure cooperation between states.
In this Section, I hope to demonstrate: (1) that neither courts,
nor Restatements, nor even legislatures provide much hope for
institutionalizing "cooperative" choice of law solutions; and (2) that
in the most intractable areas of choice of law, cooperation would
yield few gains even if we had institutions suitable for developing
and implementing cooperative solutions.
1. The Inadequacy of Case Law as a Tool
for Enforcing Cooperation
Consider the difficulties in using the common-law process to
institutionalize cooperation in choice of law. It is true, of course,
that state courts develop state policy all the time, even in the
absence of legislative action. That development, however, is
generally incremental, and incrementalism is ill-suited to the
problem at hand. Choice of law cases first reach trial courts. Why
should any single California trial judge sacrifice forum state policy,
or her own notions of justice to the parties before her, in the name
of greater cooperation among states without knowing that her
California colleagues will follow the same course? Unless her
colleagues are committed to the same cooperative strategy, the
attempt by a single Californiajudge to pursue cooperative solutions
is doomed to failure, because judges in other states have no reason
to believe that a lone California trial court decision commits the
247
California courts to a policy of reciprocity.
For a state court system to make any credible commitment to a
policy of cooperation, then, the commitment must come from the
state's supreme court, whose decisions bind all of the state's judges.
But how can a supreme court make such a commitment? Over any
reasonable time period, too few choice of law cases reach any state
supreme court for the court to develop, through the common-law
248
process, a set of comprehensive cooperative choice of law rules.
See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 181-89.
247 Larry Kramer alludes to this problem in a footnote, conceding that "successful24

ly implementing a tit-for-tat strategy requires coordination among manyjudges within
each state." Kramer, supra note 1, at 343 n.228.
24 Geoffrey Smith has noted that in a 13-year period, the New York Court of
Appeals did not decide a single choice of law case, and during that period, every
judge on the court was replaced. See Smith, supra note 121, at 1041 n.3. In fact, the
court did decide one choice of law case, albeit without an extensive opinion and on
pleading and proof grounds. See Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 914
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The court could, of course, simply announce that it plans to adopt
a cooperative approach to choice of law problems, but a statement
at that level of generality will not generate confidence among judges
in other states that the announcing state's conception of cooperation is similar to their own.
In light of these difficulties, it is difficult to credit Lea
Brilmayer's suggestion that case reports can serve both to communicate a state's strategy2 49 and to commit the state to that strategy.2 10 Ultimately, Brilmayer herself concedes that common-law
adjudication "is not the best solution where states really wish to
coordinate their actions."2 5 ' She suggests, instead, a modified
Restatement that would provide "focal point solutions." 2 2 And
Larry Kramer, rather than arguing that courts could or should
develop a set of cooperative rules through the common-law process,
appears to see the judicial role as one of accepting or rejecting
53
cooperative "canons" generated externally.
2.

Restatement as a "Focal Point" Solution

a. DraftingDifficulties

Lea Brilmayer has suggested that choice of law cooperation can
best be achieved by having a neutral body-she suggests the
American Law Institute, through a new Restatement 2 54-draft
(N.Y. 1978) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, as a general matter, Smith is right; choice of law cases rarely reach
state supreme courts. The LEXIS search "choice pre/3 law or conflict pre/3 laws and
date > 1980," run on September 7, 1993, generated one case decided by the
California Supreme Court and two each by the New York Court of Appeals and the
Texas Supreme Court. Of course, the LEXIS search may not discover all choice of
law cases decided by a court within the designated period, but it should nevertheless
indicate that choice of law cases are rare at the state supreme court level.
249 See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 159 (suggesting that in the choice of law
context, in contrast to other game theory phenomena such as the prisoners' dilemma,
communications problems are less severe because states' choice of law decisions are
reported publicly and are available among the states).
2-' See id. (suggesting that a decision by a state appellate court on a choice of law
issue is a "commitment to the future," because it instructs lower courts (and
subsequently the same appellate court) to follow one particular choice of law theory).
25 Id. at 182.
252
Id. at 185; see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CoNFLICT 57-59

(1980).
s See Kramer, supra note 1, at 340-44 (discussing whether it is in the interest of
particular states to adopt the canons Kramer proposes).
2' See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 185-89; see also Larry Kramer, On the Need for
a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2134 (proposing that a Uniform
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complex and precise choice of law solutions. 55 She contemplates
that the drafters would "make estimates about what is most likely to
be subjectively advantageous to most of the states," 256 and that the
estimates would later be scrutinized in each individual state by a
state policymaker, to assure that the solutions are in the state's
257
subjective interest. 1
Two problems plague Brilmayer's model. First, she does not
explain how Restatement drafters are to divine the subjective
interests of the states. Second, in her attempt to minimize the first
problem by leaving it to state decision-makers to "opt out" of the
Restatement if the drafters have misjudged state interests, she
jeopardizes the entire project. A Restatement provision can only
provide a focal point solution if it is adopted widely, if not universally. Without widespread adoption, an individual state has no
reason to subordinate its interest in a particular case, because the
state has no commitment that other states will subordinate their
interests in other cases. So, if individual states choose to opt out of
the Restatement scheme, Brilmayer's coordination advantages
disappear.
Of course, Brilmayer might envision a process in which
successive modifications of the Restatement provide rules that do
advance the interests of all states. Indeed, she does suggest, for
somewhat different reasons, that frequent updating of a conflicts
Restatement would be important.2 58 But unless we assume that
each state attaches the same value to application of its own law in
a given fact situation-an assumption Brilmayer is wisely unwilling
to make-there is no reason to assume that even frequent modification will ultimately produce a choice of law rule acceptable to all
states.

259

Choice of Law Code be drafted).
255 See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 184 (recommending that the drafting process
be conducted by individuals "outside the particularized adjudication of cases" and
who2 are not "politically authoritative").
56Id.
2
11 See id. (asserting that the drafting function should be separate from the
adopting function, thereby requiring a drafting estimate to be "scrutinized for policy
approval before it is put into effect").
' See id. at 188 (suggesting constant updating in order to overcome the charge
that the Restatement is both too rigid and too amorphous, generating divergent
judicial conclusions among the states).
...
See generally Kay, supra note 66, at 591-92 (presenting a table of choice of law
theories followed by the states).
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Consider an example drawn from the guest-host cases so familiar
to conflicts teachers and students. Suppose states A and B have
identical statutes which preclude guests from recovering for the
negligence of motorist-hosts. Suppose, however, that the policies
that underlie the two statutes are different: A's guest statute is
designed to protect domiciliary motorists against fraudulent
claims,2 6 but B's rule is designed to promote gratitude within the
state's borders.2 61 The goal of a Brilmayer-like Restatement would
be to provide a choice of law rule that would advance the policies
of both states more often than our current system of choice of law
"anarchy," which would permit each state to apply its own rule in its
own courts, so long as the accident occurred within the state, one
of the parties is domiciled in the state, or the car is registered in the
state.
Suppose then that a Restatement drafter proposes a rule, like
the rule suggested by Judge Fuld in Tooker v. Lope 262 and Neumeier
v. Kuehner,6 3 providing that when guest and host share a common
domicile, and where the car is registered in that state of common
domicile, the law of the common domicile should apply. The
proposed rule is, for state A, an improvement over anarchy because
it assures that state A motorists will be protected against claims by
state A guests wherever the litigation takes place. By contrast,
under the current anarchic system a court of state C, which has no
guest statute, might permit the A guest to recover from the A host.
The same proposed rule, however, might be worse than anarchy
for state B. Because the rule would require the courts of state B to
ignore its own guest statute if one C resident offered another C
resident a ride in B, state B would be less free to advance its policy
than under "anarchy." Moreover, the rule would provide no
commensurate gain for B because, by hypothesis, B is not concerned
about the domicile of driver and guest-only about the place in
which the guest-host relationship was established. In this circum260 See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) (citing a Canadian
guest statute as intended to "prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers,
in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies" (citation omitted)).
261 See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455 (N.Y. 1972) (stating that one
purpose of the Ontario guest statute "'was to protect owners and drivers against suits
by ungrateful guests'" (quoting Willis L.M. Reese, ChiefJudgeFuld and Choice of Law,
71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 558 (1971))); Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y.
1965) (stating that one of the three underlying policies of Colorado's guest statute is
"the prevention of suits by 'ungrateful guests'").
262249 N.E.2d 394, 404 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, C.J., concurring).
26 286 N.E.2d 454, 457 (N.Y. 1972).
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stance, when A and B have vastly different reasons for enacting

identical rules, no single Restatement provision will produce gains
from trade for both states.

2 4

One might object, of course, that even if not every individual
Restatement provision produces gains from trade, each state might
nevertheless find the Restatement as a whole an improvement over
anarchy. Indeed, Professor Brilmayer appears to concede as much
when she lists, as an advantage of Restatements, that "they can cover
a broad enough range of topics to link issues on which some states
stand to benefit with issues on which the others do." 26 5

It

is far

from apparent, however, that one could draft a Restatement that, on
balance, produces gains from trade for each state.
Here is Professor Brilmayer's problem: she believes that a
scheme promoting choice of law cooperation among the states
would be more efficient than a system of choice of law anarchy. In
the lingo of law and economics, she is confident that cooperation is
efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. 266 But even if she is correct,
she has provided no basis for every state to agree to the scheme
unless she can prove that the move toward cooperation is Paretosuperior-that it will improve the position of each of them. 267 Of
course, if the cooperation scheme were indeed efficient in the
Kaldor-Hicks sense, the states that benefit most from the scheme

In the text I have demonstrated only thatJudge Fuld's proposed rule does not
produce gains from trade. But the same analysis can be applied to rule out similar
2

rules. Thus, if the Restatement rule were to dictate that the law of the place where
the guest picked up the host should govern, the rule would be better than anarchy
for state B, but worse than anarchy for state A, because an A guest would be
permitted to recover from an A guest so long as the pick-up occurred in state C.
Under anarchy, the A court would be permitted to advance its policy by denying
recovery in this case, and the A guest would be able to frustrate A policy only if she
could obtain jurisdiction over the host in C, and could persuade the C court not to

apply A's law.
265 BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 185.
21 In the words of ProfessorJohn Hanks, "Kaldor and Hicks defimed a potential
economic move as efficient if, after the move, the winners gain more than enough to
compensate the losers." John L. Hanks, On a just Measure of the Efficieny of Law and
GovernmentalPolicies, 8 CARDOZO L. Rv. 1, 1 (1986); see alsoJ.R.Hicks, The Valuation
of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105, 110 (1940); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare
Propositionsof Economics and InterpersonalComparisonsof Utility, 49 EcON.J. 549, 550
(1939).
267 Again, in the words of Hanks, "[t]he Pareto definition holds that a proposed
move is efficient if at least one person believes himself better off after the move and
nobody believes himself worse off." Hanks, supra note 266, at 1-2; see also VILFREDO
PARETO, MANUAL OF POITcIcAL ECONOMY, 369-75 (A. Schwier trans., Augustus M.
Kelley 1971) (1927).
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could make the losers better off by making cash payments in return
for an agreement to abide by the scheme. But if we assume that no
state is about to make cash payments to sister states for adoption of
a Restatement, the cooperation scheme will be Pareto-superior (and
therefore acceptable to each state) only if the Restatement itself
makes each state better off than anarchy. Drafting such a Restatement would prove formidable, if not impossible.
Suppose, for instance, the Restatement drafters produced rules
that, for both states A and B, would be better than choice of law
anarchy, and that would maximize the gains from trade for the two
states. This set of rules, however, might not be better than anarchy
for state C, or might be only insignificantly better than anarchy. To
gain C's acceptance, then, the drafters will almost certainly have to
change some of the rules, thus denying A and B some of the gains
from trade generated by the original rules. As the number of states
involved approaches fifty, it will become increasingly difficult to
produce a single set of rules that makes each state better off than
choice of law anarchy.26
The problem is compounded by problems of forum selection.
As Professor Brilmayer recognizes, any state with a plaintiff-favoring
rule has little incentive to cooperate with other states if, assuming
268Of

course, some states might find that the Restatement, minus a few

objectionable provisions, would be better than anarchy. But if states were free to

"defect" from individual Restatement provisions, the Restatement's coordination
advantages would begin to disappear. Once each state recognized that its sister states

were not committed to the Restatement as a whole, there would be less reason for
any state to subordinate its own interest in the case at hand to gain the supposed
benefits provided by the Restatement framework.
Professor Kramer, recognizing some of these problems, nevertheless concludes
that cooperation is "plausible." Kramer, supra note 112, at 1027. He invokes the
notion that "individuals and organizations tend to satisfice rather than maximize
interests," and suggests that "cooperation is probably more beneficial than always
applying forum law." Id. at 1025. He also relies on "diffuse reciprocity" to
"encourage and buttress a regime based on cooperation," while recognizing that
diffuse reciprocity will not help foster cooperation that is not in a state's interests.
Id. at 1027. Finally, Kramer relies on institutional considerations to bolster the
argument that judges may cooperate even if not in the interest of their states:

[T]he judges' sense of making decisions for members of a federation
generates a sense of obligation not to exploit sister-states, as does the great
number of interdependent interests in other areas and the personal

relationships ofjudges in different states. The result is a judicial culture
that emphasizes fairness to the interest of other states alongside self-interest.
Id. Kramer does not, however, explain why abstract considerations such as fairness
to the interest of other states will be more important to judges than their sense of

fairness to the litigants before them.
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anarchy, the plaintiff-favoring is always applied because plaintiffs
always choose the plaintiff-favoring state as a forum. 5 9 This fact
itself does not doom Brilmayer's Restatement approach; it merely
suggests that the Restatement rules will be plaintiff-oriented if the
plaintiff-favoring states are to receive any gains from trade for
cooperating. But, as Professor Brilmayer also recognizes, a plaintifffavoring state can only apply its own rule in cases where it can
Because large states
obtain jurisdiction over a defendant.27 °
typically have more bases for asserting jurisdiction over more
defendants, large states have less reason to cooperate than do
smaller states. As a result, if any set of Restatement rules does not
track closely the rules that would otherwise be applied by large,
plaintiff-favoring states, those states will have little incentive to
adopt the Restatement.2 71
Indeed, the existing choice of law situation illustrates the
difficulty in convincing large, plaintiff-oriented states to accept
Restatement-like principles. Although, as Brilmayer points out, a
great majority of states purport to adhere, at least in some form, to
one of the two Restatements, New York and California are not
used their own
among that majority; 272 they have traditionally
27
verbal formulations in choice of law cases. 3
..9 See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 178 (noting that states, especially those with

important commercial centers and the ability to both assert jurisdiction and
encourage filings because of laws favoring plaintiffs, gain little from the adoption of
a modest choice of law rule).
20 See id. (stating that a "plaintiff-favoring law is of no use to a plaintiff if
jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the defendant").
'7 Moreover, some states might decide that even if the Restatement would be
better than anarchy, selective rejection of unfavorable provisions would leave the state
even better off. Professor Brilmayer recognizes the point when she notes that a
Restatement-like solution, even if it were to leave each state better off than under
anarchy, might unequally divide gains from trade. See id. at 185 n.66. Professor
Brilmayer speculates that a state that has not, in its view, obtained its fair share of
gains from the Restatement "might still feel pressure to go along, because there is no
other attractive proposal on the table that could supplant the one that is biased." Id.
Of course, a state-especially a large state with less to lose from an anarchic systemcould react in the opposite way, threatening to hold out, and make the entire scheme
less valuable, unless the unfavorable provisions were altered. But if enough states
chose to "hold out" in this way, the chance for ultimate agreement would be minimal.
"nSee id. at 186 n.70 (noting that New York and California were the first states
to cleanly break away from the First Restatement approach).
273 See, e.g., CURRIE, SEL.CTED ESSAYS, supra note 24, at 132 (referring to a
"vigorous" California Supreme Court and the "sound construction" results it
reached); Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique,83 COLUM. L. REV.
772, 776 (1983) (focusing on the development of New York choice of law history
since Babcock v.Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963), and concluding that the
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b. Drafting a More Modest Restatement
Even if it were impossible to generate a comprehensive
Restatement that would command universal adherence, it might be
possible to formulate a shorter list of rules or principles that would
facilitate coordination in at least some set of cases. Larry Kramer's
"canons of construction" are illustrative. 4 Kramer's canons "cover
only a fraction of the cases and do not address some important and
controversial subjects," but the canons are nevertheless designed to
27 5
capture gains from cooperation among states.
Kramer is undoubtedly right in stating that some choice of law
rules or canons will gain widespread acceptance and generate gains
from cooperation.
One of his own canons is simply a party
autonomy canon, 7 6 reflecting a principle held in high regard by
2 77
courts and scholars long before Kramer developed his canons.
Another holds that courts should respect actual reliance inter278
ests.
One must be careful, however, not to generalize from the
particular. Simply because it is possible to articulate some widely
shared choice of law policies, like protecting party expectations, it
does not follow that all choice of law cases can be resolved by
reference to generally accepted multistate policies. Thus, Kramer
concedes that his canons do not even address most tort cases-the
cases in which, I have suggested, 27' existing choice of law theories
have proved least helpful in deciding cases.
In other words, it is certainly possible to develop a set of choice
of law principles that would resolve some cases by reference to
multistate values. Game theory, however, provides no basis for
believing that anyone could draft a set of principles that would
(1) resolve all choice of law cases; (2) command widespread

"rise and fall of interest analysis could be traced and explained entirely through New
York decisions").
4
275

See Kramer, supra note 1, at 322.
Id.
276 "A Canon for Contract Cases" reads: "In contract cases, true conflicts should
be resolved by applying the law chosen by the parties, or, if no express choice is
made, by applying whichever law validates the contract." Id. at 329.
' See supra part I.B.1.
278 "A Canon for Actual Reliance Interests" reads: "Where two laws conflict, but
the parties actually and reasonably relied on one of them, that law should be applied."
Kramer, supra note 1, at 336.

2

See supra part Il.C.4.
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acceptance; and (3) produce gains from trade when compared with
choice of law anarchy.
c. Enforcement Problems
Assume for a moment that, somehow, the collective wisdom of
conflicts scholars generated a Restatement that did resolve all cases,
command widespread acceptance, and produce gains from trade.
What would prevent a particular state court, when faced with a
concrete case, from deciding to depart from the Restatement's rule
in order to apply forum law or the judge's own sense ofjustice? In
game theory terms, why should a particular court not "defect"
rather than cooperate? Professor Kramer, creating an analogy to
indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, argues that so long as each
state knows that the other is likely to retaliate for any defection,
each state has an incentive to cooperate in order to avoid losing all
280
gains from trade.
Reciprocity, however, would provide an implausible basis for
many courts to adhere to Restatement provisions. Consider a
Montana court deciding whether to apply New York law in a case
where the Restatement would make New York law applicable.
Kramer's version of game theory would suggest that the Montana
court should apply New York law to assure that, in the future, New
York's courts would apply Montana law in cases where the Restatement would make Montana law applicable. Montana's court would
fear that in some future case, New York's courts would use a tit-fortat strategy, and apply New York law in a case where the Restatement would dictate application of Montana law. This fear would
keep Montana's court in line with the Restatement, because, by
hypothesis, Montana's interests would be advanced more significantly if Montana law were applied whenever the Restatement so
provided than under a regime where Montana and New York each
apply their own law whenever some local interest would be
advanced by doing so.
This analysis is flawed at several levels. First, as a matter of
game theory, the incentive to cooperate rather than to defect
diminishes if we introduce the concept of a discount rate. The
entire game theory model assumes that the two states are seeking to
reap gains from trade. 281 If we assume that future gains-the
28 See Kramer, supra note 1, at
28"

342-43.

Recognizing this point, Larry Kramer takes a step away from game theory and
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benefit of a "favorable" New York decision several years from noware worth less to Montana than the benefit of a similar decision
today, then it is not clear that Montana's court should decide the
current case by applying New York law, as the Restatement would
dictate. Montana might be better off defecting, and applying its
own law, because it discounts the benefits that might accrue in some
future New York case.2" 2 This is especially true if relatively few
New York cases involve Montana law, and vice versa, because years
may pass before a New York court has any opportunity to retaliate
for Montana's defection.
Second, game theory assumes a set of players each seeking to
maximize her own utility."' To treat the multitude of state court
judges as a single player representing the state in a game seeking to
maximize gains from trade is simply ludicrous. How is a Montana
court to treat a decision by a single New York trial court judge who
refuses to apply Montana law in a case where Montana law would be
required by the Restatement? Is that a defection even if, in the last
ten years, twenty other New York judges have meticulously followed
the Restatement's rules? Using game theory as a framework for
choice of law problems ignores the complexities inherent in a
system in which each state is represented by numerous individual
decision-makers, many of whose decisions are never reviewed by a
more authoritative decision-maker.
Third, even if the discounting problem were somehow solved,
and even if there were a way to develop a reciprocity rule that
accounted for internal inconsistencies among the judges within a
single state, a reciprocity regime-enforcing compliance with the
Restatement by using a tit-for-tat strategy against defecting statesignores the fact that the brunt of the retaliation is faced not by the
defecting judge, but by the litigants in a private case who had
nothing to do with the defection. Suppose, for instance, that in a
tort case, an Oklahoma court had applied Oklahoma law in violation
of a Restatement provision that directed application of Texas law.
In a subsequent usury case, in which the Restatement would validate

suggests that even when self-interest will not generate cooperation, "cooperation often
is fostered by the 'diffuse reciprocity' that arises in situations of complex interdependence
between states." Kramer, supra note 112, at 1026.
282
See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 92 (1989) ("With discounting,
the present gain from finking is weighted more heavily and future gains from
cooperation more lightly.").
21 See id. at 22 (defining a game's players, and specifying that"[e]ach player's goal
is to maximize his utility by choice of actions").
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a loan agreement providing for interest permitted by Oklahoma law,
should a Texas court punish the Oklahoma court's defection by
applying Texas law to the case, perhaps causing the Oklahoma
lender to forfeit both interest and principal? That would appear to
be the result dictated by a tit-for-tat strategy, but it is hard to
imagine any court with a sense ofjustice reaching such a conclusion.
Finally, the analysis so far has assumed that one court can tell
whether another has defected from a relevant Restatement provision. In fact, as Professor Kramer has recognized in a footnote, this
assumption is highly questionable. 28 4 Even a Restatement as rigid
as the First Restatement of Conflicts proved subject to frequent
manipulation through use of a variety of now-familiar escape
devices; it is hard to imagine any form of Restatement that would
generate clear answers to each of the potentially infinite fact
situations that might develop. Hence, even if a court were inclined
to employ a tit-for-tat strategy, it may often be difficult to determine
whether a state has defected. Consider, for instance, the problem
facing the Supreme Court in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,28 5 in which
the Kansas Supreme Court, prohibited by an earlier decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court from applying Kansas law to questions
regarding interest rates on lease royalties, applied the laws of
Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana, only to "find" that the laws of
these states were identical to Kansas law. Did the Kansas court
defect?
A tit-for-tat strategy, then, proves ill-suited even in theory, and
unworkable in practice, as a mechanism for enforcing choice of law
cooperation among states. And without a mechanism for enforcing
cooperation, there is little reason for any court to cooperate if the
result of cooperating offends the court's sense of substantive justice.
3. Legislation
The discussion so far has explained why the common-law
process, even if augmented by a Restatement-like formulation of

2

' See Kramer, supra note 1, at 343 n.228 ("[S]ince cooperation depends on the
ability to punish defection, courts must be able dearly to discern whether another
state has defected. This may be the most difficult condition to satisfy, since courts
may be able to manipulate the canons in ways that hide defection to forum law.").
2- 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
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rules, is poorly suited for developing of a choice of law framework
based principally on cooperation between states. For a judge
convinced that one of the parties in the case before her ought to
win, the goal of future cooperation by other states in other cases
seems, and should seem, too remote to justify sacrificing substantive
justice in the case at hand. But if case law development and
Restatements are inadequate to the task, why not compel judges to
act cooperatively, by legislation either at the state or federal
level?2 86
By giving choice of law rules the imprimatur of an authoritative
state policymaker, legislation would eliminate some of the enforcement problems that would plague a Restatement solution to the
coordination problem. Judges who might otherwise defect from the
cooperative solution because defection appeared to produce the
"better" substantive result, or to advance state policy, would now
cooperate because defection is illegitimate in light of the statutory
command.
Legislation would not, however, eliminate all enforcement
problems. Legislation in this area would inevitably have an open
texture; determining whether a court has reached the cooperative
solution contemplated by the legislature would remain difficult. On
this point, legislation enjoys no advantage over a Restatement.
Finally, the drafting difficulties that make a Restatement-like
solution impractical 8 7 are no less serious when a legislative
solution is proposed. Drafting a statute that leaves each of fifty
states better off than they would be under choice of law anarchy is
a virtually impossible task unless the gains to be realized by a statute
that promotes cooperation are substantial. As the next Section
demonstrates, in many cases, especially tort cases, the gains are
likely to be modest if they exist at all. As a result, legislation, like
the Restatement alternative, is not a promising avenue for assuring
cooperative behavior.

Restatement could be drafted to incorporate cooperative principles, the
same document could presumably be enacted by the several states as a sort of
Uniform Choice of Laws Code. Professor Brilmayer discusses the possibility of
uniform legislation before turning to the Restatement as an institutional mechanism
for choice of law cooperation. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 183-84. Brilmayer
never
2 7 quite endorses legislation.
8 See supra part III.B.2.
286 If a
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4. Identifying Gains from Trade
A cooperative choice of law system-one in which individual
states, or individual courts within those states, subordinate their
own notions of justice in the individual case in the hope of
maximizing overall advancement of state policy objectives-has
potential to generate two forms of gains from trade. First, cooperation enables the states to implement multistate policies that would
be ignored if courts focused only on the case at hand and sought
purely to maximize advancement of state policy objectives in that
case. Second, cooperation might enable each state to assure that its
domestic policies were implemented in those cases in which the
state has greatest concern.25 5 As we shall see, however, the gains
that cooperation might generate, are not evenly distributed across
all classes of cases, and in many tort cases, the potential gains are
negligible.
a.

Multistate Policies

Consider first the multistate policies that all states share. All
states have an interest in enabling parties to plan their activities
without fear that application of unexpected legal rules will set those
plans awry. The flip side of facilitating planning is protecting
justified expectations; parties who have planned their activities with
a particular legal rule in mind ought not be surprised by the
application of a different rule unless they had some reason to
expect the application of that different rule.
These values-facilitating planning and protecting justified
expectations-exert a powerful influence in cases where they are
applicable, but in a wide range of cases it would be absurd to
believe that a court decision that comes out one way rather than
another would inhibit planning or would upset expectations
formulated by any of the parties. Party autonomy rules, which have
gained broad support among both courts and scholars in contract
cases, 28 operate both to facilitate planning and to protect expecta21 See generally BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 152 ("If a state adopts a particular
domestic rule, then it might conclude also that some particular ... territorial
application is the most sensible given purely substantive goals."); Kramer, supra note
1, at 340 ("[Sltates share the desire to advance multistate policies and to minimize the
social costs of forum shopping, which makes it advantageous to apply another state's
law in some true conflicts. More important.... states want their law applied more
in some
true conflicts than in others.").
.89 See supra part II.B.1.
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tions. But even among contract disputes, many arise out of events
not planned for by the parties, and about which the parties had
2 90
developed no expectations.
When tort cases are involved, planning and expectations are
even less likely to be persuasive factors. First, unlike contract cases,
tort cases do not revolve around a document assented to by both
parties in which they have memorialized their expectations. As a
result, there is rarely any evidence of the parties'joint expectations;
instead, there are only assertions about the expectations of one
party or the other. The extent to which tort rules operate to
condition people's behavior continues to be a matter of lively
debate, 291 but there is little chance that a particular choice of law
decision will have significant impact on the behavior of potential
tortfeasors. The parties involved in garden-variety auto accidents
are hardly likely to know about choice of law decisions. More
sophisticated repeat players-manufacturers of potentially dangerous
products, for instance-already face potential liability in enough
different states and foreign countries that a decision in a single
choice of law case is unlikely to cause them to take less or greater
precaution in manufacturing their products.
Cooperation among states would advance another multistate
policy: avoidance of forum shopping. But what constitutes forum
shopping and why we should eliminate it remain controversial
questions. As one commentator has recently put it, "the policy
against forum shopping is not a principled distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate actions, but rather a discretionary tool by
which a court may constrain actions or motives it finds distastefu - 292

Perhaps the most objectionable form of forum shopping involves
a plaintiff who chooses a forum with little or no connection to

' See supra part UI.B.2.
Compare e.g., Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand
Experience,73 CAL. L. REv. 976,1001 (1985) (concluding that introduction of no-fault
rules had no appreciable impact upon the rate of accidents) with Elisabeth M. Landes,
Insurance,Liability, and Accidents: A Theoreticaland EmpiricalInvestigationof the Effect
of No-FaultAccidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 50 (1982) (stating that introduction of nofault will result in 10 to 15% increase in auto accident deaths). For criticism of the
Landes study, see Jeffrey O'Connell & Saul Levmore, A Reply to Landes: A Faulty
Study of No-Fault's Effect on Fault?,48 Mo. L. REv. 649, 653 (1983) (finding Landes's
study simplistic).
Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. R1v. 1677, 1683-84 (1990).
21

1014

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 142:949

the dispute at hand in the hope that the forum will apply its own
law, which appears to be more favorable to the plaintiff than the law
of the states more closely connected to the dispute. Coordination
among states, however, is unnecessary to constrain this type of
forum shopping; a variety of existing doctrines limit plaintiffs'
opportunity to forum shop in this manner. First, constitutional
limits on personal jurisdiction require that the chosen forum bear
a reasonable connection to the defendant and the events leading to
liability. 293 Second, constitutional limitations on choice of law
prevent a forum from applying its own law to a transaction with
which the forum has no connection. 294 Of greater practical
significance than the constitutional limitations, however, is the
antipathy state and federal courts have shown to claims brought in
a particular state solely to take advantage of the state's plaintifffavoring law. 295 Given the state of existing law, then, cooperation
among states appears unnecessary to constrain this most blatant
form of forum shopping.
The more common case of forum shopping involves a plaintiff
who chooses the most favorable forum from among those with a
significant connection to the parties and the dispute at hand. If this
sort of forum shopping is objectionable, the objections are presumably of two sorts: first, forum shopping gives plaintiffs, who choose
the forum, an unfair advantage, and second, forum shopping
generates uncertainty, and hence, inefficiency.
Consider the plaintiff-bias created by forum shopping. The
power to choose a forum with favorable law is only one element of
plaintiff-bias.
Plaintiffs routinely choose fora out of personal
convenience (or to inconvenience the defendant), to obtain more
complete discovery, to take advantage of a particular court's
expertise (or lack of expertise), or to take advantage of a legal

" See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)
(reaffirming the principle that state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only if "minimum contacts" exist between the defendant and
the forum state).
' ' See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 280-21 (1985) (reversing
the Kansas Supreme Court's decision to apply its own law primarily out of fear that
permitting Kansas to apply its own law would encourage blatant forum shopping,
especially among class action plaintiffs); see also id. at 823-45 (Stevens,J., concurring).
..See supra part II.C.4.
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climate that might include relatively high jury verdicts. 296 Even if
choice of law rules were free of any trace of forum preference, then,
forum shopping would not disappear. Is it unfair to accord
plaintiffs the advantages that come with the power to select a
forum? As Kramer has pointed out, one problem involves determining the appropriate baseline: "The argument that allowing plaintiffs
to pick is unfair apparently assumes that the "'correct' baseline is a
random distribution," but, of course, there is little reason to take
randomness as a baseline.
Moreover, even the plaintiff-bias
generated by the right to choose the forum would be unfair in
isolation, forum selection cannot be evaluated in isolation. Our
system provides countervailing advantages to defendants: plaintiffs
bear the burden of proof, and plaintiffs' choice of forum is always
subject to jurisdictional limitations. 297 If we were to remove one
weapon-forum selection, with consequent power to influence the
law applied-from plaintiff's arsenal, it is not clear that the result
would be "fairer" without making other changes in the litigation
system.
The efficiency argument against forum shopping is equally
problematic. If the charge is that shopping for a forum that will
apply a favorable law increases uncertainty, and hence increases the
potential for litigation, the charge appears baseless. A well-advised
plaintiff will inevitably choose the forum most likely to permit
recovery. Hence, defendant faces no significant uncertainty; both
parties can assume that plaintiff will choose that forum, and may
make their decisions about settlement and litigation accordingly.
A generation of American lawyers has been conditioned to think
of forum shopping as an evil.29 8 That conditioning has come
largely from the Supreme Court's construction of the Rules of
Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act-particularly in Guaranty

2" See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping Domestic and International,
63 TUL. L. REv. 553 (1989) (comparing incentives for forum shopping in the United
States and abroad).
2 See Kramer, supra note 1, at 313 n.117.
' Forum shopping is denounced even in bankruptcy scholarship. See, e.g.,
Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. C-I. L. REv. 815, 816-822 (1987). For a critique, see David G. Carlson,
Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 453, 466-69 (1992)
(arguing that creditors' preference for federal bankruptcy law over state law does not,
in fact, create a serious danger of "forum shopping," since this problem exists only
with involuntary petitions that are rarely used in practice).
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Trust Co. v. York, 299 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Corp.,"'° and Hanna

v. Plumer."' But the prime reason to attack forum shopping in
those cases was that Congress had directed federal courts to apply
state substantive rules. 0 2 By contrast, in cases involving horizontal choice of law questions, Congress has provided no direction. No
method is apparent for determining which state's right to apply its
own law should be sacrificed in the name of conformity; in the
Erie303 cases, conformity was to be achieved, if at all, by application of state law. As Erie made clear, the federal courts have no
independent common-law lawmaking authority, and there is no
statutory or constitutional basis for requiring state courts to apply
federal rules."0 4 By contrast, state courts do have such general
common-law authority, and have less reason to defer to the policies
of sister states.
Even accepting the prevailing wisdom that forum shopping is an
evil, and that curbing forum shopping is a goal that all states share,
some states stand to lose more from a cooperative solution than
others. In particular, to large plaintiff-oriented states, losing the
power to apply their own law may cause significant frustration of
state policy at relatively little gain.30 5 If these states were not to
assent to the cooperative solution, the solution would be of little
value to the remaining states. But to obtain the consent of a large,
plaintiff-oriented state, any cooperative solution might well have to
guarantee that the rules of that state apply with great frequency;
- 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The court found that the intent of the Erie decision:
was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercisingjurisdiction
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of
the litigation in federal court should be substantially the same, so far as
legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in
a State court.
Id. at 109.
'0 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (articulating the objective that "litigation should not
come out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court").
501 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (describing "discouragement of forum-shopping" as
one of the "twin aims of the Erie rule").
s2 The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988), provides that "[t]he laws
of the several states.., shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States."
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), provides
that federal rules of procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive

right."
sos Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See id. at 78.
30' See supra text accompanying notes 268-73.

CHOICE OF LAW THEORY

19941

1017

otherwise, the state will reap no gains from trade. But a choice of
law rule that favored the law of the plaintiff-oriented state might be
worse than no rule at all from the standpoint of other states, thus
causing any cooperative solution to crumble.
b. Domestic Policies
William Baxter's comparative impairment principle380 is based
on the intuition that a state's policies are not equally implicated in
all cases. Baxter surmises that in a hypothetical negotiation among
the several states, an agreement would arise to resolve true conflicts
in a way that would maximize application of each state's policies5 -0 More recently, Lea Brilmayer and Larry Kramer have built
on Baxter's work, suggesting that a cooperative approach to choice
states to achieve optimum implemenof law problems would enable
08
tation of state policies.
There are, of course, cases in which failure to apply a particular
state's law would seriously frustrate that state's policy. Consider a
variation on the facts of Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 0 0 Suppose that Michigan enacts a statute requiring a franchisor to
demonstrate good cause for terminating a franchise. The hypothetical statute is clearly designed to protect Michigan franchisees:
either Michigan residents, or perhaps out-of-staters who own
franchises within Michigan. Burger King, a Florida corporation with
its principal place of business in Miami, drafts a franchise agreement which (1) permits Burger King, the franchisor, to terminate
the franchise at will; (2) provides that Florida law shall govern all
rights and obligations between Burger King and the franchisee; and
(3) gives Florida courts jurisdiction to resolve all disputes between
the parties. In this situation, if Florida courts were to apply Florida
s06 For Baxter's discussion of comparative impairment, later embraced by the
California Supreme Court, see William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem,

16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17-22 (1963).
"

See id. at 7-8.

Although they build on his insights, neither Brilmayer nor Kramer endorse
Baxter's comparative impairment analysis. See BRIULMAYER, supra note 1, at 146-47
(characterizing Baxter's analysis as rigid and difficult to apply); Kramer, supra note

1, at 317-18 (criticizing complexity of comparative impairment approach).
Nevertheless, Brilmayer accepts the notion that each state would trade
application of its own law in some cases for application in other cases that would
more seriously affect state policy. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 170. Similarly,
Kramer argues that cooperation is important "because states want their law applied

more in some true conflicts than in others." Kramer, supra note 1, at 340.
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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law to permit termination of a Michigan franchise, they would
effectively obliterate Michigan's ability to regulate franchises within
the state. All franchisors would incorporate in Florida (unless other
states proved equally generous to franchisors), and would draft
similar agreements with Michigan franchisees. Even if Florida has
an interest in protecting Florida franchisors who seek to avoid
litigation costs over "good cause," Florida and Michigan might both
be better off if Florida courts applied Michigan law to protect a
Michigan franchisee in return for some other concession Michigan
might make to Florida law.
But how often do choice of law rules have such a significant
impact on state policy? In the franchise hypothetical, a Florida
decision applying Florida law would change the behavior of future
actors: franchisors would incorporate in Florida or like states,
would draft agreements like the one hypothesized, and would be
encouraged to terminate Michigan franchises without hard evidence
of good cause.
It is much less clear, however, that choice of law decisions will
have any impact on future behavior, especially in tort cases. First,
tort law itself may have marginal impact on the behavior of many
actors in the society. Potential injury victims, for instance, appear
unlikely to adjust their exposure to risk as the possibility of
compensation rises."' 0 That is, drivers do not appear likely to
drive less, or to drive more carefully, if state law were to limit
recovery for wrongful death or to adopt a comparative negligence
rule. Potential airplane passengers may take the train to avoid the
risk of an aircrash, but few would take the train because legal rules
limit compensation for death resulting from a crash.311
oSee Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and ComparativeNegligence: A Reappraisal,
87 YALE L.J. 697, 713-19 (1978) (arguing that a safety-incentive rationale for
contributory negligence is unpersuasive and noting that the advent of workers
compensation-which provides compensation to workers without regard to fault-did
not spark a major outbreak of carelessness). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIs OF LAW 169 (4th ed. 1992) (asserting that law needs a concept of victim
fault in order to give potential victims proper safety incentives).
"1Posner acknowledges the argument that "itis unrealistic to expect people who
are not deterred from careless conduct by fear of bodily injury to be deterred by fear
of a money judgment, or, in the case where the negligence of the victim is a bar to
recovery, by inability to obtain compensation for the injury from the injurer." Id. at
204. Posner does not reject the argument, but merely limits its scope, noting that
negligence has a much broader domain than automobile accidents, and that "[v]ery
few commentators think that medical malpractice or products liability has no effect
on the behavior of doctors and manufacturers respectively." Id.
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For sophisticated potential tort defendants, at least some tort
law rules have a definite impact on behavior. Hospitals and
manufacturers of potentially dangerous products, for instance,
undoubtedly take greater precautions, do more testing, and
dispense more warnings than they would if potential tort liability
were less significant.3 12 For other potential defendants-drivers,
for instance-expansive tort liability has a different impact: they
purchase more insurance. And if expanded tort liability leads to
more recoveries, insurance companies will certainly change their
313
behavior by increasing rates.
Even if a state's tort law implements a regulatory policy that
affects the behavior of potential tort defendants and insurers, it
does not follow that choice of law rules will have any impact on
party behavior. Consider first a manufacturer of goods sold nationwide. A choice of law rule could require that the manufacturer's
liability for personal injuries caused by the product should always be
determined by either the law of the place of manufacture or the
place of incorporation. The manufacturer could then take appropriate precautions given the tort law of that state. But such a rule
would almost certainly lead to a "race to the bottom," with individual states relaxing tort law rules to attract business, industry, and
jobs." 4 And few states would be willing to adhere to a rule that
left their own citizens uncompensatbd because of a defendantoriented tort rule adopted by a state that has made itself a haven for
manufacture of dangerous products. But any other choice of law
rule would inevitably subject the manufacturer of nationally
distributed products to the tort law of many states. The manufacturer could not, then, adjust its behavior in accordance with the tort
law of any particular state. Hence, choice of law rules would be
unlikely to affect the manufacturer's behavior.
Choice of law decisions are similarly unlikely to affect the rates
charged by insurance companies who insure activities that are
inherently mobile or that are conducted on a nationwide basis.
Given the uncertainties in the contours of tort law within each state,
together with uncertainties about the frequency with which events
2
313

See id. at 204-05.
Posner argues that high premium rates will, in turn, discourage some risky

drivers from driving, and therefore have some effect on the incidence of accidents.
See id. at 203-04.
.14 These same states, by virtue of low population plus tax revenues from the new
business, could then compensate their own citizens' injuries out of general tax
revenues.
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will occur in various locales, even a series of unexpected choice of
law decisions is likely to have minimal impact on the rates charged
3 15

by an insurer.

The point, then, is that even if it were possible to draft and
enforce a set of cooperative choice of law rules or canons in a wide
range of cases, the cooperative regime would not substantially
advance the domestic regulatory policies of the several states. In
many cases, particularly tort cases, choice of law rules would have
no effect on the primary behavior of citizens, and so a cooperative
scheme would generate minimal gains from trade.
C. The Empty Promise of "Rights"and "Fairness"as a
Foundationfor Choice of Law Theory
The preceding Section undermines the central premise of
modem consequentialist choice of law theories. "Efficiency"pursuit of economic gain through adoption of a cooperative choice
of law system-provides little basis for courts or legislatures to
depart from their own inclinations aboutjustice between the parties
in the dispute at hand. What, then, of "rights" and "fairness" as a
basis for choice of law theory? Lea Brilmayer has argued that courts
and scholars have paid too little attention to choice of law
rights. 3 6 She and others-most notably Douglas Laycock 31 7 and
Perry Dane3 1 --have focused on the importance of "rights" as a
constraint on judges faced with choice of law cases.
515 See C. Robert Morris, Jr., EnterpriseLiability and the ActuarialProcess, 70 YALE
LJ. 554,575 (1961) (concluding that a single claim by a guest against a host "will have
no appreciable effect upon insurance rates").
For localized activities conducted within a state, insurance companies may well
charge rates that reflect an expectation that domestic law will be applied to liability
claims. But, as we have seen, those are precisely the cases in which courts, without
the aid of a cooperation scheme, have been most certain to apply the law of the place
of injury. That is, for injuries suffered on real property within a state, or suffered as
a result of employment at a site within the state, courts tend to apply the law of the
state of injury. However, as Morris observed, even for defendants who act locally,
insurance companies may set rates based on nationwide loss experience because "the
credibility of their experience on a state-by-state basis would be too low to set reliable
rates." Id. at 570. When Morris wrote in 1961, insurance companies had developed
separate product liability rate classifications for New York state, but not for the other
states in the nation. Even if the practice has changed substantially in the intervening
30 years, for small states at least, loss experiences for many risks are likely to be too
small to enable insurers to develop rate classifications for a single state.
316

See B~nMAYER, supra note 1, at 193-96.

...
See Laycock, supra note 3, at 261-88.
18
3 See Dane, supra note 1, at 1242-75.
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Choice of law "rights" are a peculiar breed because, to be taken
seriously, they must trump other common-law "rights." Suppose,
for instance, that the legislature and courts of the state of Maine
have established a "right" of a creditor to recover against a
guarantor of a debt, so long as the guarantor is an adult of sound
mind. When a Maine creditor brings an action against a guaranty
executed in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts married woman of
apparently sound mind, a Maine court might well conclude that the
creditor has a right to recover. A choice of law right that requires
application of Massachusetts law, and thereby denies relief to the
creditor, would supersede any tort right created by Maine law. By
what authority do choice of law rights supersede other rights
derived from substantive law? Professor Laycock has argued that
the federal constitution creates choice of law rights.' 19 Professor
Brilmayer, by contrast, has looked to political theory and basic
fairness as sources of choice of law rights. 20

This Section consid-

ers these sources of authority for choice of law rights, and concludes
that in many cases, they do not provide a basis for persuading a
common-law judge to abandon her notions of justice between the
parties in the case at hand.
1. The Federal Constitution
Douglas Laycock has most extensively developed the thesis that
the federal constitution removes from the states virtually all power
to develop their own choice of law rules. He contends that the
federal constitution permits only a single set of choice of law rules
applicable in both the state and federal courts. 2 That set of
rules, according to Laycock, must be territorially based. 22
Laycock draws his thesis from the structure of the Constitutionprincipally from the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which
prohibits discrimination against out-of-staters, and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which, in his view, requires that each state apply the
same law to a given set of facts. 23
19

See Laycock, supra note 3, at 261-337.
320 See BRLMAYER, supra note 1, at 191-230.
521See Laycock, supranote 3, at 297 ("[O]nly a single determinate set of choice-oflaw rules can implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause."); see also id. at 331-36
(arguing that Congress and the federal courts, not the states, have authority to
develop choice of law rules).
" See id. at 331 (I have argued that our fundamental law allocates state authority
territorially and that this allocation should drive choice of law.").
3" See id. at 297.
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Laycock recognizes that his thesis is inconsistent with existing
constitutional practice.124 Justice Stone's landmark opinion in

25
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission'

emphatically rejected the notion that only a single state's law may
apply to a particular set of facts. 26 More recent Supreme Court
opinions, particularly Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 27 have given
states nearly absolute constitutional freedom to apply their own law.
Although the Court hinted in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutt3 28 that
it might restore some teeth to constitutional limits on choice of law,
the Court quickly retreated in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,' 29 indicating
that even in those instances where one state's court was constitutionally required to apply the law of another state, the Supreme
Court would defer to the forum state's questionable conclusion that
the other state's law was identical to the law of the forum.
In the absence of Supreme Court compulsion, state courts are
unlikely to embrace Laycock's constitutional theory. To the extent
that Laycock rests his thesis on protection of individual liberties, 8 0 his arguments appear too abstract to gain widespread
support. Consider his principal liberty-based argument: "[U]njustifled discrimination against a citizen of a sister state is a constitutional wrong to that citizen, regardless of the impact on national
24 Indeed, in the first paragraph of his article, he contends that "[w]e took a
fundamental wrong turn at the very beginning of modern choice-of-law scholarship."
Id. at 250.
S- 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
326 Justice Stone explains:

While the purpose of [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] was to preserve
rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts andjudicial proceedings
of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in other states, the
very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some of the
attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause
as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states
for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is
competent to legislate.
Id. at 501.
32 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
328 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
3- 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
3
3' Laycock's
principal arguments are structural, but where his structural
arguments appear weak or inconclusive, he tries to rely on individual liberties
arguments. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 336. Thus, he discusses the individual
libertyjustification for prohibiting discrimination in response to a critique asserting
that choice of law cases have no real impact on national unity or interstate relations.
See id. at 264-65.
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unity.""' In Laycock's view, the constitutional prohibition against
discrimination invalidates choice of law rules that depend on the
citizenship of the parties."8 2 He supports the rule by demonstrating the supposed unfairness of any other rule in a series of
guest statute hypotheticals 8 8 Interest analysts would characterize
Laycock's hypotheticals as "true conflicts." Laycock rejects the
concept of "false conflicts,""8 4 but if Laycock had used false
conflict hypotheticals instead of true conflict hypotheticals, his
conclusions would have appeared far less attractive.
Suppose, as Laycock does, that Delaware has a guest statute but
Maryland does not. On Laycock's view, if a Maryland guest were to
bring an action against a Maryland host for injuries suffered as a
result of the host's negligence on an automobile trip in Delaware,
the Maryland court would be constitutionally compelled to deny
recovery, at least so long as the parties formed their relationship in
Delaware."' That is, a Maryland court whose sense of justice
demands recompense for injuries caused by negligence would be
prevented from vindicating that sense of justice, even though the
only parties conceivably burdened by recovery would be a Maryland
defendant and Maryland insurance company., 6 The likelihood
31Id. at 265.
32

See id. at 278.

See id. at 276-77.
334Id. at 275.
s-" Laycock does not argue for any particular territorial rule. Presumably, he has
not yet decided whether the Constitution compels the Maryland court to apply the
law of the seat of the relationship or the law of the place of the accident, or some
other law. He is clear, however, that the court may not decide the case based on the
citizenship, or domicile, of either of the parties. See id. at 278.
3' On Laycock's analysis, if the Maryland court were to grant recovery to the
Maryland guest, the court would also have to grant recovery to a Delaware guest
injured in an otherwise identical accident. Since, under Laycock's theory, a Delaware
court would have to reach the same result as a Maryland court, the Delaware court,
too, would have to grant recovery in that case. But the Delaware court would not be
permitted to discriminate against a Maryland host, so Laycock's principle would
require the Delaware court to grant recovery even to a Delaware guest against a
Delaware host. Since the last conclusion is patently ridiculous (Delaware court
permitting recoveries for a Delaware accident where both parties were from Delaware,
despite existence of Delaware guest statute), the initial premise-that a Maryland court
would be permitted to grant recovery to a Maryland guest against a Maryland hostmust be incorrect.
By the same token, Laycock's analysis would require a Delaware court to grant
recovery to a Delaware guest injured by a Delaware host if the parties had met in
Maryland and suffered an accident there-even though the Delaware court is
concerned about fraudulent claims against Delaware insurers, or affronted by
ungrateful guests suing their benefactor-hosts.
33
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that a Maryland court will deny recovery to plaintiff guest out of
obeisance to an abstract antidiscrimination principle appears quite
small, at least absent some compulsion from Congress or the
Supreme Court.
Even if the state courts do not voluntarily adopt Laycock's
constitutional vision, and even though the Supreme Court has
essentially rejected it, Laycock's thesis cannot simply be dismissed.
His argument, after all, is that existing case law is wrong, and that
courts should embrace territorial principles as a matter of constitutional law. Laycock derives his argument in part from the text and
structure of the Constitution, and in part from his own intuitions
about political theory, law, and justice. This is not the place for a
thorough critique of Laycock's work, but it is worth noting that the
textual and structural arguments, while plausible, are hardly
compelling. Laycock does not argue that the framers contemplated
and explicitly precluded the possibility of discrimination in choice
of law;... he argues instead that the principal policy that led the
framers to include the Privileges and Immunities Clause-the need
to promote national unity-requires a broadly inclusive reading of
the clause. 3 s But even Laycock recognizes that discrimination in
choice of law poses no current threat of disunion.3 3 9 Forces
unknown to the framers promote national unity today more
effectively than constitutional restriction on choice of law ever
could. The interdependence of state economies, fed by improvements in transportation and communication, together with the
enormous growth of federal power over the past two centuries,
make it difficult to accept Laycock's argument that discrimination
in choice of law, perhaps "amplified by interaction with some new
3 40
source of interstate tension," could threaten national unity.
Given the tenuous textual and structural foundation for
Laycock's constitutional argument, courts have little reason to
invoke the Constitution to overturn the existing system of "choice

...
Laycock does quarrel with the proposition that Anglo-American law had no
concept of choice of law at the time the Constitution was drafted. See id. at 306-08.
He does not, however, advance the proposition that the framers drafted the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause with a particular choice
of law vision in mind.
338 See id. at 263.
339 See id. at 264.
10
m Id. at 265. Indeed, Laycock immediately seeks to buttress his argument by
postulating an "individual liberty" basis for the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See
id.; supra notes 330-34 and accompanying text.
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of law chaos" unless there are strong instrumental reasons for doing
so, or unless political theory or fairness requires departure from the
existing regime. 4 1 We have already seen that in many cases,
instrumentalism provides no basis for substituting order for "chaos";
now we turn to arguments from political theory and fairness.
2. Political Theory and Basic Fairness
Lea Brilmayer, herself a major contributor to policy discussion
about choice of law, has also argued that choice of law theory has
3 42
overemphasized policy at the expense of rights and fairness.
Unlike Laycock, Brilmayer does not look to the Constitution as a
source for rights;141 she argues for common-law development of
"principled limits, based on fairness, on what the state may do." 44
She also looks to political theory as a guide for determining what
3 45
choice of law rules are fair.
Professor Brilmayer argues from political theory that a person
has a negative right to be left alone by a state unless given some
opportunity-through voice or exit-to influence the state's political
decisions. 46 Thus, she concludes that an individual's domicile
always has power to regulate her behavior, but she also concludes
that territorial connecting factors, if they are "purposeful" or
"volitional," suffice to justify a state in subjecting an individual to its
3 47

laws.

Brilmayer questions the fairness of imposing on an individual a
conception of substantive justice developed by a state with whom
the individual has had insufficient contact.3 48

In our complex

federal system, this concern appears farfetched. Because our system
is federal, all citizens have at least some input-through congressional and presidential elections-into both the substantive law and the
choice of law rules applied in each state. Hence, Brilmayer's
41 Laycock himself advances both instrumental and fairness-based justifications.
He emphasizes, in particular, predictability and uniformity of result, see Laycock,
supra note 3, at 318-20, the need to give people an incentive to learn and obey the
law, see id. at 320, and the intuitive injustice of discrimination against citizens, see id.
at 267.
32 See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 193-210.
5

See id. at 192.
"Id. at 194.
See id.

at 220.
Id.
3s See id. at 219.
-6 See id.

347
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abstract political theory concerns about the bases for state coercion
appear somewhat misplaced. Any state that inappropriately coerces
citizens of another is answerable to political processes in which each
state's citizens do have a voice. Moreover, because our system of
laws is so complex, the very notion that each citizen has input into
all the laws that govern his behavior is, on a practical level,
ludicrous. Choice of law cases rarely involve the fundamental
political decisions that define a state. They often involve issues as
peripheral as charitable immunity, burdens of proof, or guest
statutes-issues that, in some cases, the political processes have
never addressed, and that, in any event, most citizens have never
heard of or thought about. To rely on an individual's input into
political processes as a basis for subjecting him to a state's laws on
issues like these is to resort to the most fictional of fictions.
Moreover, Brilmayer concedes that her political-rights perspective will often leave a "wide range of permissible options." 49 She
then looks beyond the negative right to be left alone, and seeks to
develop "a right to fair treatment, even by a politically authoritative
state.""'0 Brilmayer's emphasis on this sort of fairness in the
choice of law process is somewhat peculiar. The current chaos in
choice of law thinking has produced at least one distinct advantage:
it has permitted judges great discretion to pursue fairness in the
individual case, unbound by any significant statutory or common-law
constraints. Courts and judges instinctively react to unfairness, in
choice of law as elsewhere. When a litigant can demonstrate that
application of a particular rule of law would disrupt settled
expectations, the litigant is virtually certain to persuade the court
not to apply that rule.8 5 ' Indeed, Justice Stevens has suggested
that protection against unfair surprise might rise to constitutional
dimensions.35 2 The problem for choice of law theory, then, is not
49
Id.
3

at 221.
50 Id. at 222.
" An exception to this observation might be appropriate in the case of insurance
companies. Unfairness to insurance companies, however, is hard to measure because
of the imprecision with which insurance companies capture particular risks. As
Morris put it, "[a] very fine analysis is not attempted." Morris, supranote 315, at 574.
Morris notes, for instance, that if out-of-state guest claims "occur only infrequently,
they will have practically no effect upon insurance rates." Id. at 575. And if the
insurance company would not have increased its rates to take account of the risk of
occasional liability, it is difficult to label liability unfair to the insurance company.
Moreover, as Morris also notes, if there are many guest claims, insurance companies
will take account of those claims in setting rates. See id. at 576.
352 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,327 (1981) (Stevens,J., concurring)
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eliminating unfair results. On the contrary, the problem in many
cases is choosing among several "fair" results.
Brilmayer recognizes, correctly, that ordinary notions of fairness
(roughly embodied in Brilmayer's "negative rights") are inadequate
for resolution of many choice of law issues."' 3 She then develops
other, more abstract and rarefied conceptions of fairness, conceptions she calls "actuarial fairness" and "mutuality." 5 4 According
to Brilmayer, "[m]utuality would require that the substantive rule
not be applied to an individual's detriment unless the individual
would be eligible to receive the benefits if the tables were
turned." 55 She offers a similar, although not identical, explana35
tion for her "actuarial fairness" principle.
Brilmayer also recognizes that these principles, like her negative
rights, operate only as a constraint on courts; they do not provide
unique solutions for most choice of law problems. Moreover,
Brilmayer's abstract discussion of her principles often leaves their
practical import unclear. She differentiates her "mutuality" and
"actuarial fairness" principles from a requirement that rules be
jurisdiction-selecting. 5 7 She would not require that a choice of
law rule be "completely blind to content," but her mutuality requirement would require that "the decision not turn on which side the
rule happens to benefit." 5 ' I find this statement incomprehensible. If Brilmayer means to allow judges to consider the
content of substantive rules only in order to pick and choose among
the available jurisdiction-selecting choice of law rules, then her
mutuality requirement is, contrary to her assertion, equivalent to a
requirement that rules be jurisdiction-selecting. Thus, she might
permit courts in guest statute cases to decide whether liability
should be determined according to the law of the place of accident,
or the law of the seat of the relationship, or the law of the common
domicile, if any, of the guest and host. Each of these rules, and
many combinations of the rules, are jurisdiction-selecting.
(noting that the "desire to prevent unfair surprise to a litigant has been the central
concern in this Court's review of choice-of-law decisions under the Due Process
Clause").
Iss See BR LmAYER, supra note 1, at 221-22.
35

Id. at 221-27.

355 Id. at 225.
" See id. at 222-23 n.93.
35* See id.
3
58 Id.
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If, on the other hand, Brilmayer's mutuality requirement would
permit a court to develop rules that are not jurisdiction-selecting,
then the rules will almost inevitably favor one party over the other.
Consider, for instance, the eminently sensible choice of law rule
embodied in section 2-506 of the Uniform Probate Code:
A written will is valid if executed in compliance with Section 2-502
[written wills] or 2-503 [holographic wills] or if its execution
complies with the law at the time of execution of the place where
the will is executed, or of the law of the place where at the time of
execution or death the testator is domiciled, has a place of abode
or is a national.3 59
Assume such a rule were not mandated by statute, but were
proposed instead for a Restatement. Would this "rule of validation"
meet Professor Brilmayer's "mutuality" test? The rule clearly favors
those persons who would benefit under wills over those persons
who would take by intestate succession if the will were invalid. It
does so for good reasons: persons who write wills often move from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and so long as formalities differ, often
trivially, among jurisdictions, only a rule of validation can accomplish a goal common to all jurisdictions-effectuating the intent of
the testator. Brilmayer does not provide concrete examples that
would flesh out her principles, but if her mutuality test would
preclude rules like section 2-506 of the Uniform Probate Code, I
would suggest that the problem is with the mutuality test, not with
60
the rule of validation.
That Brilmayer's abstract fairness concepts are difficult to
decipher and apply is only part of the problem. The more abstract

§ 2-506 (1991).
0 Also consider section 203 of the Second Restatement:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it
provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the
contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatlyin excess of the rate
permitted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable
law under the rule of § 188.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 203 (1971). Would such a rulewhich appears to favor lenders over borrowers (at least if viewed from the time of
litigation rather than the time of the transaction) meet Brilmayer's "mutuality" or
"actuarial balance" tests? At one point, Brilmayer distinguishes "formal" from
"informal" imbalance, and suggests that a rule that favors creditors over debtors
would be formally balanced because an individual might be either a creditor or a
debtor, but informally imbalanced because an individual might expect to be a debtor
more often than a creditor, or vice versa. See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 223 n.94.
359 UNIF. PROB. CODE
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a conception of choice of law fairness, the less likely that courts will
embrace it. If a litigant can establish reliance on a particular legal
rule, or frustration of expectations, a court is likely to avoid
unfairness to the litigant, even if that would require application of
a substantive rule that the court believes unwise, or that has been
rejected by the forum's legislature. 6 1 But if the litigant's only
fairness argument is couched in abstractions, focusing on potential
differences in treatment when the litigant compares himself with
to focus on the
other, hypothetical litigants, a court is more likely
62
rules.3
law
substantive
competing
the
merits of
Consider an example. Suppose ajudge in state A has before her
a case in which lender seeks to recover on a note. Borrower's
defense is that the loan agreement violated the usury limitation of
state B, the borrower's home state. The loan transaction had
connections with both state A and state B, and the interest rate was
one percent higher than state B's legal limit. State A's legislature
has repealed its usury limitations, on the ground that usury limits
unfairly deny credit to poorer borrowers. Thejudge has before her
§ 203 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and is
deciding whether to adopt that section's qualified rule of validation.
The borrower argues that the section is unfair, not because
borrower had an insufficient connection with state A, and not
because borrower had relied on the law of state B, but because a
hypothetical borrower would not be able to prevail under state B's
usury limit even if all connections with the two states were reversed.
Against this abstract fairness argument, however, thejudge marshals
two facts: (1) she, and her state's legislature, believe that usury
statutes unfairly and inefficiently reduce the availability of credit to
poor persons, and (2) she believes that it is unfair for a borrower to
take the lender's money and then assert his own contract's illegality
as a basis for refusing to repay. My guess is that abstract principles
of fairness-principles like Brilmayer's mutuality principle-will not
prevail in cases like this.
The central problem for choice of law, then, is this: in many
multistate cases, particularly tort cases, no persuasive fairness or
"6Perry Dane, an advocate of what he calls a "Norm-Based" theory of law, views
respecting settled expectations as "the defining goal of the enterprise of law." Dane,
supra note 1, at 1238. Dane acknowledges, however, that even those who do not

share his view-those who hold to a "Decision-Based" theory of law-recognize the
importance of respecting expectations. Id.

" Brilmayer's discussion of choice of law rights is not the only one plagued by
undue abstraction. See id. at 1205.
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instrumental concerns compel application of one law or another.
In those cases, judges quite naturally focus on substantive law values
rather than on choice of law. Because choice of law theory becomes
largely irrelevant to the decision-maker in these cases, choice of law
is perpetually in chaos. This may dismay conflicts teachers and
conflicts students, but the system has only one major cost: it
increases uncertainty among those who have been victims and
perpetrators of wrongdoing, and hence increases the volume of
litigation. But since no individual judge or court can eliminate that
uncertainty, "choice of law chaos" remains the best alternative in
each individual case. As we have seen,SS designing a cooperative
system to eliminate that uncertainty is likely to be an impossible
task. But to focus instead on rights and fairness is to lose sight of
the problem at hand.
CONCLUSION

Much of modern choice of law scholarship is premised on the
notion that better thinking will lead to a more coherent approach
to choice of law. Even those theorists who have abandoned the
notion that a comprehensive set of principles can resolve all choice
of law cases s4 continue to search for approaches that will generate unique solutions to choice of law cases.
My thesis has been that this search is misguided. In a wide
range of cases, especially tort cases, no set of choice of law rules or
principles will eliminate the existing regime of "choice of law
chaos." In these cases, no choice of law principles are sufficiently
compelling to cause judges to exalt choice of law considerations
over concerns about the facts and substantive law issues involved in
the individual case.
What has led choice of law scholarship astray? In part, the
problem has been scholarship that starts from general principles
(sometimes derived from political theory) and operates deductively
to arrive at choice of law conclusions.3 65 This deductive approach

-" See supra part III.B.
'6 See BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 186-87 (criticizing Restatements because they
"set out to derive all of choice of law from a single unifying intellectual principle");
Kramer, supra note 1, at 321 ("[I]t is a mistake to try to derive a comprehensive
system of rules from a single choice of law theory.").
' See, e.g., Dane, supra note 1, at 1205 (developing notions of "vestedness" from
a norm-based theory of law, but devoting little attention to tangible choice of law
issues).
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to choice of law stands in sharp contrast to the common-law
method, which makes real-life facts the starting point for analysis.
Professionalism furnishes another explanation for the continuing
quest for conflicts principles to resolve all choice of law cases. If
choice of law principles are not sufficiently important to override
substantive outcomes, what role is left for conflicts
concerns about
65
scholars?
The truth-that choice of law principles are often irrelevant in
deciding cases with multistate conflicts-poses no real threat to the
professional self-interest of conflicts scholars. Choice of law
principles sometimes are and should be critically important-but
only sometimes. Much work remains to be done in identifying areas
where choice of law principles should influence the decision-making
process. But to pretend that choice of law principles should be
determinative in all multistate cases is to increase obfuscation in an
area already characterized more by mud than by crystal.

'' Cf BRILMAYER, supra note 1, at 106 (suggesting that Currie himself engaged in
normative analysis when identifying state interests, noting that "[i]f scholars were
really to eschew normative thinking, they would have very little to say").
In his later years, David Cavers, one of the century's most significant choice of
law scholars, wrote in a tribute to Brainerd Currie's work: "Conflict of laws... has
not been central to my interests, and I wonder if it would have remained so for
Brainerd Currie. I suspect that in time he would have looked to other fields to bring
to order." David F. Cavers, A Correspondencewith BrainerdCurrie, 1957-58,34MERcER
L. REv. 471, 498 (1983).

